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ABSTRACT
This assignment seeks to explore the role of privatisation in attracting foreign
direct investment (FDI) to South Africa and Zambia. In doing this, literature
review method based on primary and secondary documentary sources have
been utilised. In order to attract FDI, the study revealed that it is necessary to
get the policy environment right. Creating an investor-friendly environment
which promises good return on investment in line with the international
"regulatory" framework - the World Bank's International Finance Corporation
(IFC) and Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and the World
Association of Investment Promotion Agencies (WAIPA) requirements - is
therefore significantly important.
The World Bank regards Zambia's privatisation programme as the model for
Africa. South Africa finds itself in a contradictory position. On the one hand it
is the leading economic power in Africa, while on the other hand it still lags
behind in terms of restructuring its parastatals. Privatisation programme in
South Africa has been very slow. However, the government and other
stakeholders, particularly in 1997, have been trying to get privatisation off the
ground.
The conclusion is that both South Africa and Zambia succeeded in attracting
FDI through their processes of privatisation. In both countries major FDI
inflows have been an outcome of privatisation. FDI is important for creating
employment, debt reduction, empowerment, transfer of technology and
managerial skills. However, these countries follow different approaches to
privatisation. Due to the slow privatisation pace in South Africa, it is
recommended that South Africa learn from Zambia's approach and
experience. This would enable South Africa to fully explore some of the
benefits of privatisation.
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OPSOMMING
Hierdie opdrag ondersoek die rol van privatisering in die trek van direkte
buitelandse beleggings (DBB) in Suid-Afrika en Zarnbie. Ten einde hierdie
doelstelling te kon bereik is 'n titerere oorsig van primers en sekondere
bronne gedoen. Hierdie studie het bevind dat In gunstige beleidsomgewing
DBB sal trek. Die skep van 'n beleggings-vriendelike omgewing wat goeie
dividende beloof en in Iyn is met die internasionale "regulerende" raamwerk -
die Wereldbank se International Finance Corporation (IFC), Multilateral
Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) en World Association of Investment
Promotion Agencies (WAIPA) - se vereistes is van kardinale belang.
Die Wereld Bank beskou Zarnbie se privatiseringsprogram as die model
program vir Afrika. Suid-Afrika bevind haarself in 'n teenstrydige posisie. Aan
die een kant is sy Afrika se voorste ekonomiese moondheid, en aan die
anderkant is die programme om haar staatsondernemings te herstruktureer
nog in hul kinderskoene. Privatiseringsprogramme in Suid Afrika het tot
dusver baie stadig verloop. In 1997 het die regering en ander
belanghebbende partye egter privatisering van die grond af probeer kry.
Die konklusie is dat beide Suid-Afrika en Zarnbie daarin geslaag het om DBB
te lok met hul privatiseringsprogramme. In beide lande was groot DBB die
uitkoms van privatisering. DBB is belangrik om werk te skep, skuld
vereffening, bemagtiging, en die oordrag van tegnologie en
bestuursvaardighede. Hierdie lande volg egter verskillende benaderings tot
die privatiseringsproses. Vanwee die stadige privatiseringsproses in Suid
Afrika word die voorstel gemaak dat Suid-Afrika by Zarnbie leer in hul
benadering en ervaring. Dit sal Suid-Afrika toelaat om al die voordele van
privatisering te ontdek.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
1.1. Problem Statement
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has grown at a phenomenal rate since the
early 1980s, and the world market for it has become more competitive.
Developing countries are becoming increasingly attractive investment
destinations, in part because they can offer investors a range of "created"
assets (Mallampally and Sauvant, 1999: 1). Nevertheless, among developing
countries, though, the distribution of world FDI inflows is uneven. In 1997, for
example, developing Asia received 22 percent; Latin America and the
Caribbean, 14 percent; and Africa, 1 percent (Mallampally and Sauvant,
1999:3).
FDI has become an important source of private external finance for
developing countries. This is simply because it is different from other major
types of external private capital inflows in that it is motivated largely by
investors' long-term prospects for making profits in production activities that
they directly control. While FDI represents investment in production facilities,
its significance for developing countries is much greater. Not only can FDI add
to investible resources and capital formation, but, perhaps more important, it
is also a means of transferring production technology, skills, innovative
capacity, and organisational and managerial practices between locations, as
well as of accessing international marketing networks (Grosse, 1996).
Transnational Corporations (TNCs), consisting of parent firms and affiliates,
are the first to benefit from these assets or networks, however, domestic firms
which are directly linked to such systems, for example, nonequity
arrangements (these may take many forms, including joint ventures;
management contracts; public-private partnerships; etc) may also benefit
tremendously when these assets are transferred and, so will the wider
economy of the host country if the environment is conducive.
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Mallampally and Sauvant (1999:3-4) state that the greater the supply and
distribution links between foreign affiliates and domestic firms, and the
stronger the capabilities of domestic firms to capture spillovers from the
presence of and competition from foreign firms, the more likely it is that the
attributes of FDI that enhance productivity and competiveness will spread. In
these respects, as well as in inducing transnational corporations to locate their
activities in particular country in the first place, policies matter.
The trends in developing countries is that given the potential role of FDI can
play In accelerating growth and economic transformation, developing
countries are strongly interested in attracting more of it. They are taking steps
to improve the principal determinants influencing the locational choices of
foreign direct investors (Table 1).
Table 1: Host Country Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
Host country determinants
Type of FDI classified Principal economic determinants In host
by motives of firms countries
Policy framework for FDI
-Eccncmic. pontlcat. and social stability
-Rules regarding entry and operations
.Standards of treatment of foreign affiliates
.Policies on functioning and structure of markets
(especially competition and policies governing
mergers and acquisitions)
-Intemational agreements on FDI
.Privatisation policy
•Trade policy (tariffs and nontariff barriers) and
coherence of FDI and trade policies
•Tax policy
Economic determinants (see table on the right)
Business facilitation
-Investment promotion (Including image-building and
investment-generating activities and Investment-
-Iacllitatlon services)
-lnvestment incentives
-Hassle costs (related to corruptlon and
administrative efficiency)
.Social amenities (for example. bilingual schools.
quality of life)
.After-Investment services
Market-seeking -Market size and per capita income
-Market growth
-Access to regional and global markets
-Country-speciflc consumer preferences
.Structure of markets
Resource/asset-
seeking
-Raw materials
-Low-cost unskilled labour
-Skilled labour
Efficiency seeking
•Technological. innovative. and other created assets
(for example. brand names). including as embodied
in individuals, firms. and clusters
-Physicat infrastructure (ports. roads. power.
telecommunications)
-Cost of resources and assets listed above,
adjusted for labour productivity
-Otner input costs, such as transport and
communication costs toifrom and within host
economy and other intermediate products
-Membership of a regional integration agreement
conducive to the establishment of regional corporate
networks
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 1998: Trends and Detenninants, Table IV.l, p. 91.
2
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1.1.1. Policy Framework
Developing countries have, during the past decade or so, begun liberalising
their national policies to establish a hospitable regulatory framework for FDI
by relaxing rules regarding market entry and foreign ownership, improving the
standards of treatment accorded to foreign firms, and improving the
functioning of markets. These "core" policies are important because FDI will
simply not take place where it is forbidden or strongly impeded (UNCTAD,
1998:92).
However, changes in policies have an asymmetric effect on the location of
FDI: changes in the direction of greater openness allow firms to establish
themselves in a particular location, but do not guarantee that they will do so.
In contrast, changes in the direction of less openness (for example,
nationalisation or closure to entry) will ensure a reduction in FDI.
Other related policies may include privatisation policies and policies
determined by international agreements a country has signed. UNCTAD
World Investment Report of 1997 defines "privatisation as a special case of
acquisition, as it involves purchases of firms from the state" (UNCTAD,
1998:92).
Furthermore, the report is of the view that privatisation has two dimensions:
an FDI-policy dimension and a competition-policy dimension. If privatisation
welcomes foreign investors, it broadens the scope of FDI. The competition-
policy dimension becomes relevant if, in industries characterised as natural or
near-natural monopolies, the sale of a privatised company of a domestic or
foreign investor only means the transfer of a monopoly from the state to a
private agent.
3
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Moreover, international investment agreements provide an international
dimension to national FOI policies. Some of them focus on insurance and
protection, for example the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)
of the World Bank, while others deal with broader issues specific to a
liberalised FOI.
FOI policy frameworks are only one determinant of the location of investment
among host countries. Countries must also pay attention to other factors that
influence investors' locational decisions. For example, countries should
emphasise coherence between the various policies that can affect FOI, in
particular, between core FOI policies and trade policies.
1.1.2. Business Facilitation
With FOI policy frameworks becoming more similar, countries interested in
encouraging investment inflows are focusing on measures that facilitate
business. These include investment promotion, investment incentives, after-
investment services, improvements in amenities, and measures that reduce
the "hassle" costs of doing business.
While by no means new, these measures have proliferated and are becoming
more sophisticated, targeting individual investors and investments in particular
industries. After-investment services are noteworthy because they can
encourage reinvestment by existing investors, who, if satisfied, provide
publicity for the host country, sparking further investment. Financial or fiscal
incentives are also used to attract investors, even though they typically figure
into investors' location decisions only when the economic determinants are in
place.
4
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1.1.3. Economic Determinants
The most important determinants for the location of FOI are economic
considerations, which come into full play once an enabling FOI policy
framework is in place. They may be divided into three groups: those related to
the availability of location-bound resources or assets; those related to the size
of markets for goods and services; and those related to cost advantages in
production.
The challenge for developing countries (e.g. South Africa and Zambia, which
are the gist of this study) is to develop a well-calibrated and, preferably,
unique combination of factors determining FOI location and to match those
determinants with corporations' strategies. Policies intended to strengthen
national innovation systems and encourage the spread of technology are
central because they underpin the ability to create assets.
1.2. Purpose of the Study
The primary purposes of this study are:
I. to investigate the role that the privatisation of state owned enterprises
play in attracting FOI, with special reference to South Africa and
Zambia;
II. to assess how successful privatisation of state owned enterprises has
been in attracting FOI;
iii. to compare the political economy of privatisation in South Africa and
Zambia; and
iv. to furnish recommendations on the way forward.
5
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1.3. Significance of the Study
International experience shows that FDI is one of the major forces that drive
economic growth. The reason being that there are extras that flow in along
with foreign capital, as FDI brings in equity financing, which helps increase
production and growth, which in turn increases employment opportunities, and
bring in new technology and skills.
Thus, in examining and analysing the role of privatisation to FDI, the study
follows the reasoning that when countries embark upon privatisation, they
liberalise their economies thereby implementing market-friendly policies to
foreign investors. This is so because for a number of cost-cutting, market
opportunity and networking reasons, transnational corporations have actively
sought to participate in the privatisation process (Odie, 1993:7). Odie goes on
to say that host countries, for their part, have sought to involve foreign
investors in order to tap their vast capital resources and to gain access to their
considerable technological, management and marketing skills. This study will
show that:
I. a major factor behind the FDI growth is the continued trend towards
privatisation (UNCTAD, 1998:8);
II. South Africa will have to speed up its privatisation programme if it wants
to attract more FDI;
iii. the consolidation of the South African economy might facilitate its
developmental role in the Southern African region; and
iv. there are lessons to be learned by South Africa from Zambia's
privatisation approach and experience. Zambia was a country where
previously nationalisation dominated its major sectors of the economy
and today is cited by the World Bank as the leader of privatisation in
Africa (African Development Report, 1997:42).
6
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1.4. Theoretical Framework and Conceptualisation of Key Concepts
1.4.1. Theoretical Framework
Privatisation has become a global phenomenon in the past few years.
Regions that have contributed most to this trend are Latin America, Eastern
Europe and East Asia and the Pacific Rim. Up to 1993, the extent of
privatisation activity in sub-Saharan Africa had been relatively limited
although, since then several African countries have also embarked on
economic reforms involving privatisation (Gist and Laidlaw, 1996:8).
On a global scale, the bulk of privatisation took off after the fall of Berlin Wall.
The term "privatisation" was given wide currency by the sale of British
Telecom in 1984, and since then many developing countries have launched
privatisation programmes, and many more are in the process of joining the
club. The dimensions of the privatisation have been huge. The most profound
change of all has been in the Eastern Europe and the countries of former
Soviet Union after the fall of Communism, which adopted a variety of
techniques to transfer ownership rapidly to private hands (Donaldson and
Wagle, 1995: 1). One of the techniques they used was "voucher privatisation"
as to spread shares to everyone in the country.
Privatisation has typically been one policy among a set of structural reform
policy measures. These measures include trade liberalisation, deregulation,
financial sector restructuring, and opening to foreign direct investment
(Sheshinski and Lopez-Calva, 1998, p.13). Business Times (1998/11/15),
Business Day (1999/06/09), Sigcau (1999/02/16), Financial Mail (1998/06/12),
Pfeffermann (1996), Tanyi (1997), and Udemans (1996) contend that
privatisation facilitates foreign direct investment and the transfer of
technologies since it opens up opportunities for private sector to manoeuvre.
Odie (1993:7) maintains that privatisation accounts for a significant share of
FDI that is occurring during the current phase of rapid globalisation of the
world economy.
7
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Since the late 1980s, few would deny that most African governments have
played their own part in paying lip-service to privatisation (African Business,
1996:36). As a result, FOI flows in the region remain low - only equal to a
mere 3 percent of the total FOI flows in the developing countries, comparable,
for example, to those of a single Asian developing economy, Malaysia - but
they have risen since the early 1990s, and some countries are doing better
than previously in terms of inward FOI (UNCTAO, 1998:163).
In most African countries today, private sector is increasingly present by the
virtue of market liberalisation. Privatisation in Africa is becoming an
increasingly important, although far from fully explored, avenue for foreign
investment. Consequently, more and more African countries are cementing
their intentions to establish a private sector base, and as a result of these
initiatives, opportunities for FOI have been created by steadily expanding
privatisation programmes in countries such as Angola, Cape Verde, Cote
d'ivoire, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal,
South Africa, Tunisia, Uganda and Zambia, and the recent introduction of
similar programmes in Botswana, Burkina Faso, Eritrea, Madagascar,
Namibia and Zimbabwe (UNCTAO, 1998:170).
In the past, African States deterred foreign direct investors through barriers
that include the exclusion of foreign investors from land ownership,
restrictions on the use of expatriate labour, and requirements for sundry
permits and approvals (Weigel, Gregory and Wagle, 1997:3). In most cases,
restrictions have been imposed for many reasons, including concerns over
excessive foreign influence and loss of national wealth, desire to promote
indigenous entrepreneurship and workers, and desire to achieve transfer of
technology and management techniques. A large state role in the economy
also deterred FOI, whether through price controls, methods of capturing rents
from natural resource exploitation and monopolies, or through the presence of
a large state enterprise sector (Ibid.).
In reversing the barriers of the past to FOI, privatisation of state-owned
enterprises proves to have an indirect effect on FOI. Cross-national evidence
8
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also show that countries that are open to foreign investment stand a share in
the rising global prosperity that globalisation brings (UNCTAD, 1997).
Privatisation methods such as direct sales and the sales process thereof
proves to stimulate openness to foreign investment (Weigel et ai, 1997).
Clearly, in developing countries the economic benefits of privatisation are now
widely accepted because of the symbiotic link between privatisation and
capital markets development since faster rates of privatisation are associated
with the broadening and deepening the supply of domestic and international
capital. This link is also supported by Pfeffermann (1996), he maintains that
privatisation has been a major magnet for FDI in the transition countries. For
example, in Latin America a high proportion of FDI has consisted of
purchases of formerly State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). Pfeffermann
(1989:5) showed that, typically, this was followed by modernisation and
expansion which the former state enterprise was unable to finance of which
fifty percent of privatisation FDI was in infrastructure, including
telecommunications, electric power, ports, toll high ways and so on.
According to UNCTAD World Investment Report (1999) the slow pace of
privatisation in Africa is the reason why the continent has not been an
attractive FDI destination despite the high reported FDI profitability in the
region. The report furnishes that the rate of return on Africa operations of US
transnational Corporations in 1997 was 25% compared with the average US
affiliate of 12%. African Business (1999:5) maintains that Japan firms scored
average returns of 6% on FDI in Africa in 1995 compared with a world
average of 2%.
Despite the setbacks, African governments are still eager to maximise the
benefits from FDI and minimise harmful side effects. They realise that
restrictive economic policies have reduced the benefits and increased the
costs of FDI through deadweight costs of regulation, economic costs of
protection, inefficient project structures, encouragement of the use of transfer
pricing to repatriate profits, and fiscal losses from tax incentives. Recently,
countries that have liberalised have benefited more from FDI. This process is
9
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expected to be sustained without major reversals, as more and more
countries see the benefits of more liberal policies toward FOI.
Global integration will continue to drive FOI flows, wherever the economic
environment is open to it. Globalisation will increasingly blur the distinction
between foreign and domestically owned enterprises, and between developed
and developing countries. Countries that are open to foreign investment stand
to share in the rising global prosperity that globalisation bring. Nevertheless,
to create an enabling environment for FOI, a large unfinished agenda of policy
reform remains. Some of the countries that have made progress in reducing
restrictions, including some already receiving large amounts of FOI, still have
some way to go toward providing a fully open environment for FOI.
Furthermore, many more countries have only begun to re-examine their
policies toward FOI or the impact of their general economic policies on FOI
flows. Yet these countries have not missed their chance to participate in
global FOI flows. The rapid increase in FOI volumes in recent years has
shown that this is not a zero sum game. As more countries open up to FOI,
global integration will increase, leading to an increase in overall FOI flows.
The challenge for the future is therefore to open more economies and sectors
to foreign direct investment, thereby bringing opportunities for economic
development to a larger part of the developing world.
1.4.2. Conceptualisation of Key Concepts
1.4.2.1. Public Corporations
A public corporation can be described as a semi-independent body
established by an Act of Parliament and entrusted with the task of providing
some public utility or trading or manufacturing service for, and on behalf of the
state. Hanson (1963: 18) identified the characteristics of public corporations
follows:
I. They are wholly state-owned.
10
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
II. They are not subject to parliamentary financial scrutiny such as that
to which government departments are subjected.
III. They are statutorily created and outside the ambit of ordinary
company law.
IV. They have corporate status and thus can be sued, hold property
and enter into contracts.
v. In theory, at least, they are independently financed through their
revenue and also capital borrowing powers.
VI. Employees of public corporations are not civil servants but are
employed directly by, and subject to, conditions of the corporations.
Easy to note in the above discussion is that public corporations are viewed in
terms of a working definition as public production for private consumption.
Such public production, according to jacobs (1999:17), refers to the
ownership, or international managerial control if the enterprise is in
government hands. jacobs maintains that often public enterprises produce or
distribute goods or services, and then sell them to either producers or
consumers at a price which may not cover costs.
1.4.2.2. Privatisation
There is no officially stated position on the concept of privatisation and
certainly no universal definition. The word has been used in many different
senses within South Africa and in a large number of other countries and the
meaning of the concept gained many different tinges and variations.
According to Peacock (1994:3) privatisation is commonly defined as the
transfer of government-owned industries to the private sector, implying that
the predominate share in the ownership of assets on transfer lies with private
shareholders.
Brynard (1995:30); Donaldson (1995: 13); Dunleavy (1986: 1); and Hanke
(1987:14), are of the opinion that privatisation is strictly the permanent
transferring of service or goods production activities previously carried out by
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public service bureaucracies to private firms or to other groups of non-public
organisations, such as voluntary groups.
Mahadea (1988: 143) states that there are various methods of privatisation
and maintains that the important ones are: denationalisation (the sale of
publicly owned assets to the private sector), contracting out (the franchising to
the private sector of the production of state-financed goods and services), and
management and staff buy-outs (managers and workers buying out the
enterprise where they have been working).
1.4.2.3. Commercialisation
Commercialisation is defined as a process directed at establishing private
sector management principles, values, practices and policies within the public
sector organisation (Brynard, 1995:30). It is important to note that here the
private sector will deliver service while the company remains under the
management of the public sector (Van Rooyen, 1994:8). Thus, the ultimate
objective of commercialising public enterprises is to make them commercially
viable so that they can eventually be transferred to the private sector with
minimum or no government shareholding.
1.4.2.4. FDI
There are two distinct types of foreign investment - portfolio investment and
direct investment. The portfolio investment involves the purchase of stocks
and bonds in specialised funds (i.e. emerging markeUcommodities) and this is
a return driven financial transactions. Important to note is that no jobs or
infrastructure creation. This kind of investment strictly flows to where the
markets are highly attractive and thus, highly liquid (volatile). On the other
hand the FDI involves spending on capital goods. Clearly, this investment
requires a permanent interest in the enterprise, long-term commitment and
investment in human capital. And unlike portfolio investment, it creates jobs
and infrastructure, the reason why it is perceived as the engine of economic
growth.
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FDI according to Keegan (1997) & Bartlett and Ghoshal (2000) occur when an
investor based in one country invest or acquires assets in another country
with the intent to manage those assets. For example, Sappi Limited, a South
African paper company acquired SD Warren, an American paper company in
1994 with the intent to upgrade the mills and manage them. In such cases,
jacobs (1999:9) states that the investor is typically referred to as the "parent
company" and the asset as the "affiliate" or "subsidiary".
1.4.2.5. Divestiture
Divestiture refers to the process of transferring SOEs to private investors. The
divestiture programme is an ambitious attempt to unlock the economic
potential of the country by permitting resources of people, money and
technology to be put to their best use, thereby increasing efficiency to achieve
better living standards for all (GHANA, 2000). Essentially, the programme is
intended to reduce the size of the public sector and improve the performance
of SOEs by mobilising private sector management and capital, thereby
reducing the financial and managerial burden on government. To this end, the
state will be able, more efficiently, to manage the business of government,
using the proceeds from sale of SOEs to improve infrastructure, health
services and education.
1.5. Methods of Research
This study takes a qualitative approach to research. In doing this, literature
review method based on primary and secondary documentary sources have
been utilised. Consulted literature includes: i) academic journals, magazines,
newspaper and electronic reports; ii) official government documents which
entails legislation, working and discussion papers and annual reports; and iii)
publications and working papers particularly of IFC, World Bank, IMF, MIGA,
and the WTO.
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As a qualitative researcher, caution has been exercised in utilising particularly
unrefined primary sources. Because of this, the degree of reliability has not
been compromised. However, some of the evidence utilised to validate and
substantiate arguments has been relied on in part of their expert opinion
weight.
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CHAPTER TWO: FDI AND PRIVATISATION
2.1. Reasons for and Against Privatisation
Advocates of privatisation argue that most activities at local and national
government levels could be provided more efficiently by the private sector The
logic behind privatisation originates from a neo-classical perspective of
allocative efficiency which promotes market competition. Hildyard (1997)
argues that market competition serves "public interest" because individuals
express their choices through the market, which translates into individual
freedom and prosperity. And these are maximised when funds are allocated
efficiently since in market competition people can purchase what they want at
prices determined by the laws of demand and supply which leads to the
wealth generated by private effort trickling down to the benefit of all.
Clearly, the general notion of privatisation is that the role of the market in the
economy should be enhanced vis-a-vis that of the state and that the share of
the private sector should increase, with a corresponding reduction in
government involvement in the economy (Kirkpatrick, 1987:235). The idea
that private ownership has advantages over public ownership in terms of
being inherently more efficient, as well as that it induces a better public sector
financial health is not new. In 1776, Adam Smith wrote:
"In every great monarchy in Europe the sale of the crown lands would produce a very
large sum of money which, if applied to the payments of the public debts, would
deliver from mortgage a much greater revenue than any which those lands have ever
afforded to the crown ... When the crown lands had become private property, they
would, in the course of a few years, become well improved and well cultivated" (Smith,
1976 in Tanyi, 1997).
In the same vein, Bouton and Sumlinski (1997), Sheshinski and l.opez-Calva
(1998) also contend that the transfer of assets from public hands to private
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hands through privatisation of SOEs yields both efficiency and welfare gains
since performance induced by the private property rights is increased. To this
is the assumption that private property induces greater efforts to the making of
profits.
The reasoning that privatisation raises the efficiency of enterprises partly rests
on the neo-classical theory of the firm. According to this theory, competition
prompts economic agents to pursue maximising behaviour (Mahadea,
1995:89). Firms are encouraged to produce in a technically efficient manner in
order to minimise costs or maximise profits. Furthermore, competition among
producers ensures that only the efficient firms survive in the long run. This
way the welfare is maximised as consumers pay the lowest possible price for
goods and services.
However, owing to various market imperfections such as public goods,
externalities and information asymmetries, some form of government
intervention is often called for to provide some goods and services via state-
enterprises (Ingham, 1995). To this effect, the neo-classical theory assumes
that the state should playa minimalist role in the economy. This is because
Utilitarians know that every state intervenes in its economy regardless of
whether the economy is laissez-faire or not. They contend that whenever
laissez-faire is unable to ensure the best possible outcomes, state
intervention is justified (Biersteker, 1990).
Another widespread opinion about privatisation comes from Property Rights
Theory (PRT). This theory attempts to explain differing levels of efficiency
between private and public enterprises in terms of the principal-agent
relationship. The typical large private firm is owned by shareholders
(principals) but operated by professional salaried managers (agents). Owners
have the power to censure or sack the management if they are unhappy with
their performance.
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Public enterprises in contrast with private enterprises, taxpayers who in
principle own state assets have no formal property rights to the enterprise and
as a result, management can perform extremely poor and continue do to so
without any threat of take-overs. To this is the thinking that the attenuation of
property rights in the public sector contributes to a lower efficiency level than
in the private sector.
However, Joseph E. Stiglitz, a World Bank Senior Vice President,
Development Economics and Chief Economist do not necessarily agree with
this view. He argues that in large Western private enterprises, separation of
ownership and control does not clearly define private property rights since,
"The owners of shares, like the ownership of bonds, is indeed clearly defined; the
shareholder can buy and sell, or hold those rights. But those rights do not "add up" to
a real ownership-based control of the company when those shareholders are
atomised and dispersed" (Stiglitz, 1999: 10).
Nevertheless, the historical experience shows that privatisation can transform
inefficient SOEs and boost economies through creating a better environment
for FDI. However, this is a complex business and each country has to
determine the approach that best suits its circumstances. Thus, in developing
countries, policymakers should clearly understand their primary goal: the
transfer of SOEs to the private sector, while not compromising the their
efficiency.
To this end, it is important to restructure before privatising, since SOEs tend
to be outdated, to be inefficient and to be overstaffed. Thus, practices must be
modernised like in the case of France whereby costs had to be trimmed and
the labour force had to be reduced (Breytenbach, 1999a). But it is often better
to let the new owners make these commercial decisions.
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Important to note is that privatisation can be a political agenda like in the case
of South Africa whereby trade unions are opposed to it due to the perceived
job losses associated with privatising SOEs. Therefore, it is important to
identify groups which are likely to be affected most with this. For example, in
the case of South Africa, thousands of workers were set to be retrenched in
the process of restructuring (Business Times, 1999/10/17).
Clearly in this case, it is politically necessary to incorporate special measures
to elicit these workers to support privatisation. Some of the measures may
encompass employee share options (ESOPs), which are found to be very
effective in times such as these (Finnemore, 1997). Failure to implement
appropriate measures is likely to fuel oppositions against privatisation and
thereby hampering the success of the whole programme.
Moreover, those on the left of privatisation, although questioning its
transformative role, their main concern is also the one of protecting the "family
silver". One of the proponents of the "family silver" argument is Brendan
Martin - an author and consultant working with trade unions on public sector
reform issues. Martin argues that the New Right has cleverly, even cynically,
exploited peoples' aspirations and the sluggish response to them within
conservative public sector management; the Right has seized the language of
'choice' and 'empowerment' and attached it to their idea of marketising the
public service (Hildyard, 1997:3).
Martin continues however to say that the effects of commercialisation have
generally been the opposite of the rhetoric, to strengthen the power of service
providers and allow them to choose who they serve, rather than transferring
power and options to users. Two or more tiers of service have emerged as a
result, with power and choice increasingly a function of how much money
people have rather than being based on equal citizenship. Ownership has not
been significantly diversified to workers, individual shareholders or small
businesses, as big companies have gained most from divestitures. The
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majority (and the most valuable) of the privatised companies are now
controlled by transnational corporations (Ibid.).
Consequently, Martin argues, the privatisation of state-owned or provided
assets and services has turned many of the Third World's most valuable
assets or resources - from state oil companies to television networks, from
banks to roads, railways and airlines - over to a small privileged group of local
and foreign buyers, the vast majority of state enterprises being sold to a
domestic or foreign purchaser, or to a joint-venture consortium, often at prices
far below their real value. In Mexico, a group of 37 businessmen, who
between them controlled 22 per cent of the country's gross national product,
were the major buyers in all but one of the country's large public sector sell-
offs (Hildyard, 1997:4).
Furthermore, many workers and poorer people, particularly in the South, have
had their situation further undermined by the privatisation of essential utilities
and services. Southern governments, in a vulnerable position because of their
indebtedness and their reliance on development agencies for investment
funds, have been pressured by the World Bank and the IMF to sell state
owned enterprises or to transfer their management to the private sector.
Privatising water and sewage utilities, for example, can be justified on the
grounds that years of neglect by governments unable or unwilling to fund
investment had led to decaying water mains and sewers, whilst unpaid bills
and other inefficiencies raised prices; in addition subsidies did not reach those
they were intended to.
Thus, it can be argued that private capital and expertise are needed. But
raising private capital, especially foreign, can be a very expensive process
and where capital is successfully raised, the growing inequalities to access
the water can undermine the programme.
19
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Those on the left of privatisation also argue that the processes of liberalisation
do not only deny workers, poorer people and communities the access to
affordable services, however, they also remove the democratic accountability
of service providers from the people who use and depend on them. Thus, the
neo-liberal development model does not only constrict what can be decided,
but rather it also shifts who decides.
This is partly because the institutional and economic power IS now
concentrated in the hands of transnational business and bodies such as the
World Bank, the IMF and WTO, which operate with few or none of the
principles or processes of democratic government, such as elections,
accountability or transparency. And as a result, the ability of nation states to
manage their countries' affairs on behalf of all their citizens has been
significantly undermined.
2.1.1. Capital Inflow
According to the Global Development Finance 2000, a new study by the
World Bank, FDI was the single largest source of private capital and the most
stable source of capital flows to emerging markets in 1999 (Global
Development Finance, 2000:2). The study further reveal that overall, net long-
term flows in 1999 from international capital markets to developing countries
continued to fall from the low levels reached in 1998 to levels last seen in the
early 1990s.
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Table 2: Net long-term flows to Developing Countries, 1990-1999
(billions of US dollars)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Total 98,5 124 153,7 219,2 220.4 257.2 313,1 343.7 318.3 290.7
Official flows 55.9 62.3 54 53.4 45.9 53.9 31 39.9 50.6 52
Private flows 42.6 61.6 99.7 165.8 174.5 203.3 282.1 303.9 267.7 238.7
International capital markets 18.5 26.4 52.2 99.8 85.7 98.3 151.3 133.6 96.8 46.7
Debt flows 15.7 18.8 38,1 48.8 50,5 62.2 102.1 103.4 81.2 19.1
Bank lending 3.2 5 16.4 3.5 8.8 30.4 37.5 51.6 44.6 -11.4
Bond financing 1.2 10.9 11.1 36.6 38.2 30.8 62.4 48.9 39.7 25
Other 11.3 2.8 10.7 8.7 3.5 2.2 3 -3.1 5.5
Equity flows 2.8 7.6 14,1 51 35.2 36.1 49.2 30.2 15.6 27.6
Foreign direct investment 24.1 35.6 47.5 66 88.8 105 130.8 170.3 170.9 192
Source. Global Development Finance, 2000, p.36.
Table 2 shows that FDI flows to emerging markets rose by US$24.1 billion to
US$192 billion in 1999_ This increase was at a slower rate than in earlier
years, despite a spate of privatisation and mergers and acquisitions activity in
the developing world, especially in the crisis-afflicted countries. The greater
resilience in FDI flows in the face of financial crises reflects the tendency for
FDI to be more responsive to long-term growth trends than to short-term
changes in financial returns.
Important to note is that FDI policies and privatisation policies will not
guarantee the inflow of capital to the host economy. Capital inflows will only
prevail if the host country's capital account is liberalised. In practice,
international financial liberalisation increases capital flows to developing
countries and helps domestic firms in these countries fulfil their needs for
credit. Private flows are also regarded as a way to provide developing
countries with resources for investment at a time of shrinking development
assistance.
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However, witnessing from the financial crises that struck Thailand, Indonesia,
and Korea during the period 1997-1998; and Russia and Brazil during the
period 1998-99 it is clear that international financial markets are subjected to
unpredictable swings, costly crises that drives away investors thereby
worsening the economic instability.
This is because in developing countries the pacing of capital account
liberalisation is mainly influenced and guided by the World Bank and the IMF,
the two international financial institutions that, to a greater extent, still hold
and believe in the Washington Consensus, in terms of policy advises, who
stresses avoiding policy trade-offs that utilise external measures, arguing that
the free flow of capital, goods, and services between nations essentially result
in the increase of both economic growth at home and global economic
prosperity (Isaak, 1995:98). Against this view, Isaak maintains that national
policies involving some mix of internal, external, and financing measures must
be implemented in adjusting a country's balance of payment.
However, the domestic markets and financial infrastructure for portfolio
investments in equities and debt instruments are not well developed in many
emerging market countries. And creating the domestic infrastructure before
these markets can be opened internationally may take a long time. Lee (1997)
'-
maintains that since FDI flows are less prone to sudden reversals in a panic
than bank loans and debt financing, liberalising inward direct investment
should generally be an attractive component of a broader programme of
developing countries liberalisation.
2.1.2. Transfer of Technology
There is no denying that technology forms a fundamental competitive
advantage of firms today. From the creation of new products to knowledge of
markets or industrial processes, technology plays a major role in the success
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of both domestic and transnational firms (Grosse, 1996:781). Likewise
technology is an important base for economic growth and development. As a
result, governments pursue policies that optimise its creation and use.
According to Grosse (1996:782), the business literature generally refers to at
least three types of technology: product, process and management. Product
technology is the knowledge used to produce any product - the information
that specifies the product characteristics and uses. Secondly, process
technology is the knowledge used in production to organise the inputs and
operate the machinery - it relates to the process by which a given product or
service is produced.
Finally, management technology is the knowledge used in operating a
business - the managerial skills that enable a firm to compete by using its
resources effectively. Grosse goes on to say that each of these types of
technology can create a competitive advantage for the firm that possesses it.
That is, although all firms posses each type of technology, an advantage
accrues to firms that are able to obtain and deploy superior technology better
than their competitors.
Thus, technology enables any business operation to gain a competitive
advantage. Enterprises that cannot keep up with technological advancement
will not be able to compete both in domestic and global markets.
Governments in developing countries have come to realise the importance of
technology as a machinery to competitiveness and faced with unprofitable
parastatals sought to attract and keep up with technology by engaging in
ambitious privatisation programmes.
Through this, governments facilitate technology transfer by selling state
assets in full or in part (through forming foreign partnerships and alliances to
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which partners and/or allies agree to mutually use the technology, as a joint
venture or a cross-licensing agreement).
Brooke (1985:62) identifies and maintains that the following are means of
transferring technology: hardware (machinery); software; people transfer;
people training; documentation; communication; and agreements
(permissions). However, these means are not mutually exclusive simply
because their usage could be in varying combinations in different industries
and at different stages of the value-added chain.
Vehicles or arrangements for technology transfer, according to Grosse
(1996:790), includes: FOI; licensing; technical assistance contracts; training
contracts; turnkey contracts; representation contracts; exporting; franchising;
management contracts; R&D contracts; co-production contracts; and
subcontracting. In principle, every one of the transfer arrangements can be
used between affiliates of a TNC, and all except FOI, which can be used
between TNC affiliate and also in an unrelated company.
Consequently, FDI can be a major driving force behind the economic
development of a developing country since it tends to combine capital with
technology. This has been shown indisputably by the experience of the Newly
Industrialised Economies (NIEs) of Asia (e.g. Hong Kong, Republic of Korea,
Singapore and Taiwan). According to the United Nations and Joint
ECAIUNCTAD Unit (1997), these countries records suggest that, contrary to
the view commonly held by Third World policy-makers, the host economy can
develop indigenous technological and marketing capabilities and thereby
outgrow dependence on TNCs from richer countries fairly rapidly, if a massive
inflow of FOI continues over a sufficiently long period and if the government
acts properly in all relevant policy areas especially in market friendly policies
that favours and promote private ownership.
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2.1.3. Debt Reduction
Accumulated budget deficits over time lead to public debt and public debt
management is one of the central tasks that many developing countries face
in order to attract foreign investment, particularly FOI because it is associated
with MNCs long-term commitment to a specific sector of the host economy.
The relative significance of public debt is commonly measured via its share of
the GOP (Abedian and Abraham, 1997:1-2).
According to the Keynesian theory budget deficits can be good for growth in
two ways. Firstly, it increases aggregate demand (i.e. the sum of demands in
the economy within certain parameters). This brings previously unutilised
resources into the production process, which then increases output,
Keynesians would argue. Secondly, deficits allow government spending to
increase, which could 'crowd in' private investment. What this means is that if
government spending is directed towards the maintenance of social stability,
good infrastructure and skilled labour force, private investors' expectations of
profitability would also increase.
Furthermore, when the levels of return increase, private investment would
also increase, which has a positive spillover to economic growth. However,
deficits can also be bad for growth depending, in part, on how they are
financed. For example, if local borrowing finances deficits, a peril of putting up
pressure on interest rates and 'crowding out' local investment can be
expected. Furthermore, if the increased interest rates cause capital inflows,
this would result in the exchange rate appreciating - which in turn reduces the
host economy's export competitiveness (Nattrass, 1997:207-208).
The debt situation is however reversible. Governments can ease the debt
problem in three ways: 1) restructuring the fiscus, 2) monetise the debt, and
3) privatisation of SOEs. Most developing countries prefer the last option.
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South Africa for example considers privatisation proceeds to be essential for
the debt reduction. The manifestation of this can be seen in the Finance
Minister's - Trevor Manuel - Budget speech in February 2000 saying that:
"privatisation proceeds were expected to contribute to a debt reduction of
R15-billion over the next three years" (Department of Finance, 2000/02).
In the same vein the South African Chamber of Business (SACOB) also
maintains that "the fact that the government expects to receive at least R40
billion from the privatisation of state assets over the next 3 years is positive for
the economy in the longer term because it will leave some room for further tax
reforms as government will reduce its debt-servicing costs" (SACOB, 2000:5-
6). This is essentially because part of the debt through the years has been
accumulated by unprofitable SOEs. Consequently, privatising them will relief
the debt burden on the taxpayers. Furthermore, creditors can acquire assets
in privatising as a write-off.
In contrast to privatisation, the other two options to debt reduction are short-
term solutions and do not necessarily solve the debt problem. Fiscal
restructuring (by running a surplus) is likely to result in social hardships when
social expenditures are cut (South African government also follow this debt
reduction strategy which is in line with its Medium-Term Expenditure
Framework [MTEF)).
Thus, fiscal restructuring can carry service delivery costs. Monetising the
deficit too can lead to problems related to inflation. This is the case since
monetising means that the government should redeem bonds by printing
money thereby increasing prices as money circulation increases which would
lead to rapid inflation.
Because of the problems related with the other two debt reduction options, the
privatisation option seems to be a better one. However, its success in
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reducing the debt burden depends on the amount of revenue raised and if
creditors acquired assets, on their willingness to perform to the intended
standards. Certain SOEs perform a redistributory role, for example, the
railways might provide basic transport for the lower income groups, and this
service might run at a loss. Privatising such an enterprise could mean that
taxpayers would no longer have to fund these losses, but the poor community
would lose their only means of transport. Therefore, the debt burden indirectly
shifts to the shoulders of the poor. These could prove to be a 'creative
destruction' .
There is no one perfect solution to the debt problem. SOEs can be sold to
raise revenue, but the efficiency and distributional implications of such assets
sales must be borne in mind. If fiscal discipline is to be maintained, and future
interest rates are expected to exceed economic growth rates, a primary
surplus must be run. And monetising the deficit could provide a short-term
solution at the cost of long-term macroeconomic stability.
2.1.4. Management Expertise
Faced with the high pace of globalisation, developing nations are confronted
with the ever-increasing need to attract foreign companies with competencies
to enable them to compete in global markets. FDI is one way of importing
foreign expertise. When MNCs invest in a country, they come with their staff
(this could be from their home country or any of their subsidiaries worldwide).
Furthermore, MNCs import their expertise to the host economy through their
corporate culture (this is part of their business strategy).
Similarly, for domestic firms to achieve a sustainable competitive advantage,
they need to develop, at one and the same time, global-scale efficiency,
multinational flexibility, and the ability to develop innovations and leverage
knowledge on worldwide basis (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 2000:241). These can
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be developed through acquiring foreign expertise through venturing with
foreign firms. Venturing ensures competitive advantages to pass across the
firms, although, according to (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 2000), the level of sharing
knowledge depends on the management of the interface. Through these
arrangements, domestic firms will gain access to their foreign partners'
expertise and ways of doing things in general.
2.1.5. Empowerment
In mixed economies, such as South Africa and Zambia, the well being of
individuals is dependent on the disposition of the state towards its inhabitants
(Shleifer, 1998). However, poor finance; poor identification of public-goods
aspects and inefficient regulatory control in SOEs results in the deterioration
of living standards. Faced with this dilemma, developing countries tend to
seek solutions to their problems, with the World Bank Group playing a pivotal
advisory role, by privatising. According to this view, privatisation can be
beneficial if assets are sold or services are outsourced to less empowered
citizens in the economy.
Many in South Africa believe that black empowerment is essential. This view
is expressed by SACOB showing its disappointment in April noting that Public
Enterprises Minister - jeff Radebe - announced nothing substantive on South
Africa's privatisation plans in terms of black empowerment. SACOB has these
to say:
"Meaningful privatisation is necessary both for black economic empowerment and for
the attraction of much-needed foreign direct investment. We would like to see
government back up its privatisation rhetoric by giving investors, both local and
foreign, a clear idea of how it saw privatisation in this country unfolding" (SACOB,
2000:5).
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Although moderate, however, when the Department of Public Enterprises
released the government's restructuring policy framework in August 2000, a
multi-faceted approach to empowerment has been proposed through three
kinds of intervention in SOEs restructuring processes:
I. SOE ownership can be broadened through the National
Empowerment Fund and other kinds of unit trust structures, in ways
that address the problems in existing empowerment-related
financial engineering. These new approaches can take the best
lessons (and avoid the most serious drawbacks) of international
experiences of collective investment vehicles, to provide a range of
equity schemes for those previously excluded from mainstream
economic participation.
II. Operational empowerment strategies should be improved to ensure
that beneficiaries are not merely absentee owners. They should be
able to gain meaningful access to state-regulated activities, through
training and skills development, affirmative action in management,
and entrepreneurial opportunities through outsourcing,
partnerships, affirmative procurement and easier access to finance.
III. Combining the first two strategies, alternative vehicles for
empowerment, such as employee share ownership plans and
community trusts should be piloted. It is believed that this will
improve enterprise self-management and community involvement,
and in the process raise investment in and take advantage of social
capital (Department of Public Enterprises, 2000).
However, the document is criticised for emphasising that government must
ensure that unskilled workers, most of whom are African, receive the training
needed to benefit from employee ownership. COSATU has warned that if
implemented without further reflection and nalysts, the restructuring policy
framework will result in growing inequalities of income and wealth, and large-
scale job losses (WOZA, 2000108/11).
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The situation in Zambia is different from that of South Africa. Instead, a
temporary Privatisation Trust Fund (PTF) wherein shares of newly privatised
enterprises for the subsequent sale to investors by a way of public offering
with the aim of achieving a wide distribution among citizens of Zambia, has
been established (Zambia Privatisation Agency, 2000a). Other ways of
assisting potential Zambian buyers without any funds to participate in the
privatisation programme includes: deferred payment schemes, public
flotations, and ZPA mortgage scheme for houses and deferral of payment for
houses (Ibid.).
2.2. The Policy Environment
In order for developing countries to attract FOI, it is necessary to get the policy
environment right. Creating an investor-friendly environment, which promises
good return on investment in line with the international "regulatory" framework
- the World Bank's International Finance Corporation (IFC) and Multilateral
Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and the World Association of
Investment Promotion Agencies (WAIPA) requirements - is of crucial
importance. And furthermore, as a policy to attract FOI, host countries
deliberately privatise their SOEs, implement supply-side trade policies, and
offer tax holidays to foreign firms and other incentives.
2.2.1. The Role of the World Bank: the IFC and MIGA
2.2.1.1. International Finance Corporation (IFC)
The World Bank has two subgroups dealing with investments in Africa - the
IFC and MIGA. The IFC plays an important matchmaking and technical advice
role. Itself never becomes the owner, but often the source of funding for take-
over companies willing to buy shares in the ownership for privatised state-
owned enterprises (Breytenbach, 1999a). Today IFC is the largest multilateral
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source of loan and equity financing for private sector projects In the
developing world.
Forming partnerships with private investors facilitates the above. And through
its advisory work, IFC assists host governments to create conditions that
stimulate the flow of both domestic and foreign private savings and
investment. Thus, IFC's particular focus is to promote economic development
by encouraging the growth of productive enterprise and efficient capital
markets in member countries (International Finance Corporation, 1999a).
In Africa, IFC spearheads the trends towards greater restructuring, which is
intended by the IFC to be straightforward privatisation as in Britain, Czech
Republic, and initially in Mexico and Argentina. However, in Africa, the
problems of restructuring are quite unique because states and their domestic
sector are weak (Breytenbach, 1999b: 1).
As a result, the IFC has been targeting six priority areas in this region, aimed
at: i) assisting the region to receive its attractive industries; ii) help to develop
small- and medium sized enterprises; iii) assisting in deepening financial
markets; iv) help to make assets more productive through privatisation; v)
helping to develop the region's physical infrastructure and vi) leveraging IFC's
transaction experience through joint policy work with the World Bank
(International Finance Corporation, 2000b) and (Pfeffermann, 1998:6).
In the light of these circumstances, the IFC has tried to develop an
appropriate model for African conditions based on policy-based lending,
including privatisation. This model consists of four components: the IFC (as a
facilitator), the restructuring parastatals (as privatising entities), the private
buyers (mainly foreign direct investors), and private financial institutions (as
funders).
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Consequently, the IFC plays the role of matchmaker, promoting private equity
participation by private firms through private capital. It also considers the
issue of project appraisals, guarantees, risk-sharing, underwriting securities,
co-financing and even equity participation when risks involved are too high for
private firms (as buyers) or private banks (as lenders).
The IFC is not prescriptive on private equity ownership, but is of the opinion
that foreign direct investors are better placed than domestic firms to buy state
assets. In this sense, the IFC model is one of ownership transfers from public
to private hands, although minority equity partnerships are also encouraged.
The last component of this model is private banking sector. The IFC believes
that transactions, whether equity partnership or the sale of assets, ought to be
funded by private banks.
Over the years the IFC has established financial relationships with Barclays,
Chase Manhattan, Chemical Bank, Hong Kong and Shangai Bank, the Dutch
ING Bank, Morgan Stanley Bank, the Swiss Banking Corporation and
Sumitomo Bank. The role of these banks is to finance the acquisition of equity
partnerships or the sale of assets by states or SOEs to private or private
investors (Breytenbach, 1999b:2).
Pfeffermann (1998) provides few recent examples, which illustrate the variety
of IFC's activities during the first half of 1998 in Africa:
I. IFC organised a syndication loan with 15 banks that could be worth
up to $250 million for additional developments by Pecten
Cameroon, with Elf Serepca as partner, including resumptions of
work on existing oil wells, new wells and various additional
installations.
32
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
ii. IFC and a number of other official creditors promised to provide $63
million toward the construction of the Azito thermal power in Cote
d'ivoire, which was aimed at using gas from offshore fields.
III. IFC approved a $950,000 loan to support Tesinma SC, an Eritrean
company assembling buses, trucks and commercial vehicles using
imported chassis.
IV. IFC announced plans to invest $12 million in support of medium-
sized coffee and cocoa producers in Ghana.
v. IFC signed a $4.2 million investment deal in the first new private
commercial bank in Mauritania.
VI. IFC invested in Namibia's first fully-fledged local life insurance
company.
VII. IFC's Board approved a $20 million investment for pre-privatisation
capital expenditures of Tanzania's national telephone company.
However, the IFC still has more challenges in Africa in the future. These
include building financial infrastructure, developing indigenous
entrepreneurship and developing physical infrastructure through privatisation
and by mobilising domestic and foreign capital. As a result, it is expected that
the IFC's involvement in the region should increase substantially in order to
make a difference in terms of investment.
2.2.1.2. Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)
In September 1985 the Bank's Board of Governors began the process of
creating a new investment insurance affiliate by endorsing the MIGA
Convention that defined its core mission as,
"To enhance the flow of capital and technology to developing countries for productive
purposes under conditions consistent with their developmental needs, policies and
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objectives, on the basis of fair and stable standards for the treatment of foreign
investment." (Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, 2000).
MIGA promotes private foreign investment in less-developed countries by
reducing the political risk of investment projects. It also advises developing
country members on the promotion of foreign investment. It currently has 125
member countries, and 147 signatories. Because MIGA is a voluntary
association of developed and developing countries, the support by MIGA of a
project in itself improves the assurance that investor's rights will be protected.
Furthermore, MIGA promotes development by providing investment
guarantees and coverage against the risks of: currency transfer;
expropriation; war and civil disturbance; and breach of contract by host
government. Coverage may be obtained for each type of risk separately or in
combination. The scope of coverage is determined before the guarantee is
issued. The term of cover is 15 years, however, it is probable to increase the
term to 20 years if the nature of the project requires extended cover
(DANZIGERFDI,2000a).
The following kinds of investments are insured from a member country into a
host member country: investment for the carrying out of a new project;
expansion, modernisation, or financial restructuring of an existing project;
acquisition of assets under a programme to privatise state; acquisition of
equity in a project; provision of shareholder loans or loan guarantees issued
by shareholders for a project, provided the term of the loan is at least 3 years;
loans to third-party borrowers, if equity in the project is concurrently insured
by MIGA; and technical assistance and management contracts, and franchise
and license agreements, if the contract term is at least 3 years and the
investor's remuneration is conditional on the operating results of the project
(Ibid.).
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Recent political and economic reforms in many African countries have made
the continent more attractive to foreign investors. Because of this, MIGA has
been able to play an important role in encouraging foreign investors through
providing insurance against certain political risks, providing legal advice to
members to help them create favourable legal regimes for foreign investment
and offering investment promotion assistance for specific sectors.
The following evidence shows that MIGA has focused its substantial efforts on
encouraging the flow of FDI into the continent. Since 1991, when MIGA
signed its first guarantee for a project in Africa, it has issued more than
US$120 million in coverage for approximately US$900 million of foreign
investments in eight African countries (Multilateral Investment Guarantee
Agency, 2000).
The role of MIGA in Africa is an essential one because FDI plays an important
role in stimulating economic growth. Economic growth translates into job
creation, which in turn increases demand for goods and services. As
mentioned before, besides bringing foreign capital to a country, FDI also bring
in additional benefits through technology transfer, managerial expertise.
2.2.2. World Association of Investment Promotion Agencies (WAIPA)
WAIPA is an NGO that was established in April 1995, under the auspices of
UNCTAD. The Association aims to promote the exchange of best practices in
investment promotion and worldwide networking among investment promotion
agencies (IPAs). Since its inception, IPAs from 104 countries have become
WAIPA members (UNCTAD, 2000). The following are WAIPA objectives:
I. to strengthen information gathering systems and information
exchange amongst IPAs;
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II. to share country and regional experiences in attracting investment;
III. to assist IPAs in gaining access to technical assistance and training
through referrals to relevant agencies;
IV. to facilitate access to funding and other assistance, through
referrals to relevant bilateral and multilateral agencies, for the
development and implementation of investment promotion
programmes; and
v. to assist IPAs in advising their respective governments in the
formulation of appropriate investment promotion policies and
strategies (Jacobs, 1999:35).
Furthermore, WAIPA has ten requirements for an ideal investment
environment. These are: political stability; economic strength, a welcoming
attitude; foreign equity ownership; exchange control liberalisation, a trainable
labour force; an efficient banking system; an efficient bureaucracy; sound
infrastructure; and quality of life (Breytenbach, 1999a). IPAs strive to facilitate
their governments to meet these ten requirements in promoting investment.
Thus, the role played by IPAs in developing countries is an important. Direct
foreign investors before investing in a country are likely to assess the role
played by the host country's IPA.
2.2.3. WTO: Rules of Origin and TRIMs
2.2.3.1. The WTO's Rules of Origin
Desperately in need of foreign investment and favourable trade conditions in
order to advance, many developing countries joined the World Trade
Organisation (WTO). Given the current state of affairs in the world system, a
claim can be made that the 21 st century will witness more harmonisation of
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trade and investment measures within the WTO. These take two lags - rules
of origin and Trade-related Investment Measures (TRIMs).
Rules of origin are used to implement measures and instruments of
commercial policy such as anti-dumping duties and safeguard measures; to
determine whether imported products shall receive most-favoured-nation
(MFN) treatment or preferential treatment; for the purpose of trade statistics;
for the application of labelling and marking requirements; and for government
procurement (World Trade Organisation, 1999a).
For the sake of simplicity, rules of origin seek to address minimum
requirements with regard to the local content. This is important in order to
qualify for duty-free status within a free trade agreement (Breytenbach,
1999a). The importance of rules of origin is derived from the fact that duties
and restrictions in several cases depend upon the source of imports. A tight
regulation of local content within a free trade agreement such as the Southern
African Customs Union (SACU) is precipitated by the variation in the practice
of governments with regard to the rules of origin.
SACOB commenting in relation to the protocol on the reduction of tariffs
between Southern African Development Community (SADC) pointed out that
rules of origin would be of absolute importance in the impending lowering of
tariffs given that almost all SADC members, including South Africa, have poor
customs control (Agro-Economic Week, 1998/06/03).
Clearly, the substantial transformation of rules of origin requirement within
SADC is necessary. This is a worldwide complexity since some governments
apply the criterion of change of tariff classification, others the ad valorem
percentage criterion and yet others the criterion of manufacturing or
processing operation. In a globalising world it has become even more
important that a degree of harmonisation is achieved in these practices of
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members In implementing such a requirement (World Trade Organisation,
1999a).
2.2.3.2. Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs)
Similarly to the rules of origin, TRIMs outlaws excessive local content rules
made by some governments. Breytenbach (1999a) maintains that for TRIMs,
excessive local content distorts and/or restricts international trade.
Protectionist rules are therefore outlawed, but developing countries have been
given seven years to phase out (or limit within the rules) local content
requirements. The importance of TRIMs, as defined in its preamble include,
"the expansion and progressive liberalisation of world trade and to facilitate
investment across international frontiers so as to increase the economic
growth of all trading partners, particularly developing country members, while
ensuring free competition" (World Trade Organisation, 1999b).
However, these pose a problem in defining what is a "trade-related investment
measure". According to the World Trade Organisation (1999b), the term
"TRIMs" is not defined in the main provision (1) of the TRIMs Agreement.
Furthermore, another problem with the main provision (1) is that TRIMs
Agreement is not concerned with the regulation of foreign investment. Instead,
it focuses mainly on the discriminatory treatment of imported and exported
products (Ibid.).
As a result, the local content requirement imposed in a non-discriminatory
manner on domestic and foreign enterprises will be inconsistent with the
TRIMs Agreement because it involves discriminatory treatment of imported
products in favour of domestic products. The fact that there is no
discrimination between domestic and foreign investors in the imposition of the
requirement is irrelevant under the TRIMs Agreement.
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It is therefore necessary that, through the Multilateral Agreements on
Investment (MAl), countries call TRIMs Agreement for consideration in order
to complement it with the provisions on investment policy and competition
policy (Schwanen, 1996:20). This is essential because the current TRIMs
Agreement distorts trade.
2.2.4. MNCs Preferences
Direct foreign investors have certain preferences that suit their investment
needs. These preferences can be divided into three categories, namely:
resource seeking (e.g. oil and minerals); market seeking (e.g. access to trade
blocks); and finally, efficiency seeking (such as the market itself, transport,
electricity, water supply and other important utilities). In Africa, direct foreign
investors seek to extract natural resources. UNCTAD (1998: 185) provides
that FDI frontrunners in Africa are countries with economies dominated by
primary products (particularly mineral resources).
Overall, Africa has lost in attractiveness as a market, as compared to the
markets of other developing regions, during the past two decades. However,
as many governments restructure their economies, African market has more
to offer to MNCs. Custom unions such as SACU are also removing trade
barriers to outsiders (UNCTAD, 1998: 187). According to UNCTAD
(1998: 188), except for Tunisia, none of the frontrunner countries has received
efficiency-seeking FDI on large scale. Efficiency-seeking MNCs require good
infrastructure, multi-skilled workforce, liberalised policies and easy access to
the markets of industrialised countries. This combination of factors necessary
to attract MNCs efficiency-seekers is difficult to achieve for many African
countries.
Furthermore, there are sets of requirements that make a country attractive to
MNCs, which according to Michalet (2000:7) institutional background is a
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prerequisite. As part of WAIPA requirements, ideally such background
includes - political stability; economic strength; foreign equity ownership;
repatriation of profits; efficient banking system; efficient bureaucracy; and a
non-discriminatory legal and regulatory environment.
Michalet goes on to say that requirements more directly related to doing
business are less than prerequisites. However, this does not mean that there
are not important. These requirements include a big and growing market;
efficient communication system; efficient local support industries; trainable
labour force and to lesser extent, depending on the individual MNC
preferences - fiscal incentives (e.g. tax holidays).
2.3. Host Country Policies
2.3.1. Resources Control
Resource-seekers MNCs are mostly concerned with the accessibility of
resources in the host country. As a result, excessive restrictions put on
resources will limit potential foreign direct investors. In host economies where
natural resources, particularly minerals and/or raw materials of any kind, are
the main export earnings, the restriction of resources will have detrimental
effects to those economies.
However, where the host economy is resource rich, the host government may
be tempted to restrict resources to foreign investors. In some cases local firms
may put pressure on the government for protection, while trade unions on the
same vein voicing against the privatisation of resources and/or giving away of
those resources arguing that they are "silver family" which passes from one
generation to the other.
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In cases such as these, Gomes-Casseres (1990) provides that some foreign
firms opt to venture with local firms. However, if a foreign firm prefers full
ownership above everything, it will not invest. If reverse is the case, the firm is
likely to accept the type of ownership offered by the host government.
Consequently, where competition to invest in the restrictive host economy is
high, the bargaining power of firms that prefer full ownership is invariably
reduced.
Nevertheless, many African countries do not have the bargaining power
enough to force MNCs to give-in to their country's demands. In desperate
need for FOI, which MNCs are well aware of, it is difficult for host
governments in the continent to strategise favourable conditions that suit best
their country's needs.
2.3.2. Taxation of MNCs
As a result of the complexities surrounding tax treaties, Schwanen (1996: 17)
argues that MAl should carefully examine how tax liability is assigned in a
world of global production. This is because the methods by which international
activities (of either domestic- or foreign-owned MNCs) are taxed may come to
have an inordinate effect on the location of investment. As well, difficulty in
assigning tax liability could easily become a negotiating stumbling block on
the road to greater investment and trade liberalisation.
The complexities surrounding the assignment of tax liability through MAl with
no doubt influences the flow of FOI more than other types of investment. As
FOI is mostly affected by governments' decision on corporate tax, many
countries tend to harmonise their tax regimes by entering into tax treaties
(double taxation agreements). Tax treaties are inter-governmental
agreements to eliminate or reduce the incidence of double taxation on foreign
direct investment, as well as to enable governments to give mutual assistance
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to their treaty partners in collecting taxes and obtaining information about
persons who are resident for tax purposes in their territory (DANZIGERFDI,
2000b).
Double taxation relief can take three forms. The capital exporting country may
allow for either a deduction of taxes paid in the host country, or a credit up to
that amount which would have been incurred under pure domestic taxation, or
completely exempt from taxation (Janeba, 1993:313). However, the capital-
exporting country would prefer less capital outflow when the host country
taxes foreign investment income. This reduces the exporting country's tax rate
down to zero, such that the form of double taxation relief becomes irrelevant
(Ibid.).
Furthermore, the credit method has the smallest requirement for a Pareto-
improvement (probability density function to agreement) since neither a
compensatory payment nor fully harmonised tax rates are necessary. The
exception method requires harmonised tax rates, whereas under the
deduction method an efficient capital allocation is compatible with a Pareto-
improvement only when a side payment is made (Ibid.). Clearly this suggests
that in double taxation treaties, the credit and exemption methods are almost
invariably agreed on. In choosing the tax method, increasingly governments
realise that tax competition leads to an inefficient allocation of world's capital
stock, which raises the issue of cooperation. Thus, double taxation treaties
can be understood as a form of cooperation.
2.3.3. Export Processing Zones (EPZs)
EPZ programmes are frequently an integral part of strategies for increasing
the export orientation of national economies (Nel, 1994: 106). EPZ
incorporates a free trade zone (also called as a specialised version of the free
trade zone), which is a geographically defined, enclosed and policed area in
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or near an international seaport or airport. With regard to customs, the EPZ is
like a free trade zone, and is treated as falling outside the host country's
domestic customs area (DANZIGERFDI, 2000c) & (Nel, 1994: 101).
Consequently, custom duties, import controls and export taxes do not apply in
the EPZ, but other host country laws do apply in its area. This is because EPZ
is a demarcated area which has the physical characteristics of an industrial
estate, in which a range of host country domestic laws do not apply and in
which the host country government can implement policies designed to
enable firms to invest profitably on the basis of the host country's comparative
locational advantage (Ibid.). EPZ helps, particularly developing countries that
cannot otherwise compete for FDI through other investment incentives. Thus,
EPZs are usually very pertinent in developing countries.
2.3.4. Repatriation of Profits
According to Itagaki (1988:376) uncertainty about restrictions on profit
repatriation is what constraints MNCs to invest overseas, particularly in
developing countries where macroeconomic policies are mostly unpredictable.
Many, if not most, governments recognise the need to protect foreign
investors against the limits on the transfer of investment income out of the
country. Schwanen (1996:9) maintains that the availability of such protection
is a basic requirement for attracting global FDI flows.
As a general practice, MNCs desire to repatriate their profits from the host
country to their home country. In this case, the inherent conflict of interests
between MNCs and the host government is inevitable. The host government
would prefer otherwise that profits be reinvested in the economy. However,
developing countries realise MNCs reluctance to take their capital to where
repatriation is restricted and consequently, they offer free repatriation of
profits. To this, small economies that lack the capacity to effectively compete
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for FOI are left with no other option but to offer free profit repatriation among
other incentives to make their economies competitively attractive for FOI.
Although it is clear that increasingly MNCs are becoming more independent
from the influence of states, nevertheless their affiliation with their home
country is still evident. As a result, free repatriation of profits escalates the
imbalance between developed and developing countries. This however
makes the lagging behind forever behind. Furthermore, where the host
government resort to attract FOI through EPZ and tax exemptions, free profit
repatriation policy has a harmful effect in terms of the long-term economic
growth. Hence if the small economy wants to attract FOI, there are fewer
options available but not to restrict the repatriation of profits.
2.3.5. Other Investment Incentives
An appreciation of the benefits that FOI can bring, together with the
widespread adoption of development strategies based on increased
integration in the world economy, have resulted in most countries actively
seeking FOI, often with the use of incentives. As competition for FOI
intensifies, some host governments find it increasingly difficult to offer less
favourable conditions for FOI than those offered by other competing nations.
Investment incentives can be classified three ways: 1) financial; 2) fiscal and
3) indirect incentives. Financial incentives involve the provision of funds
directly to the foreign investor by the host government, for example, in the
form of investment grants and subsidised credits. Secondly, fiscal incentives
are designed to reduce the overall tax burden to foreign investors. This
category includes such items as tax holidays, and exemptions from import
duties on raw materials, intermediate inputs and capital goods.
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Finally, indirect incentives are designed to enhance the profitability of FDI in
various indirect ways. For example, the government may provide land and
designated infrastructure at less-than-commercial prices. Alternatively, the
government may grant the foreign firm a privileged market position, in the
form of preferential access to government contracts, a monopoly position, a
closing of the market for further entry, and protection from import competition
or special regulatory treatment.
A number of governments have voiced concern with the proliferation of
investment incentives perceived to distort investment patterns in favour of
countries with "deep pockets". The complaint is about the unjust spillovers
that incentives give to MNCs. According to the WTO secretariat report issued
in 1996 there are three considerations to these: distributional, knowledge and
political economy considerations (World Trade Organisation, 1996).
2.3.5.1. Distributional Considerations
In terms of distributional considerations, investment incentives transfer part of
the value of FDI-related spillovers from the host countries to MNCs. The more
intense the competition among potential hosts, the greater is the proportion of
potential gains that are transferred to the MNCs. If the total stock of FDI
available for investment in a region is largely insensitive to the amount of
incentives being offered, host countries may find themselves providing
incentives that simply neutralise other countries' incentives without actually
increasing the amount of FDI they obtain. Such incentives are nothing more
than a transfer of income from these countries to the investing firms.
2.3.5.2. Knowledge Considerations
Arguments in favour of incentives rely heavily on the assumption that
governments have detailed knowledge of the value/size of the positive
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externalities associated with each FDI project. In practice, it would be an
almost impossible task to calculate these effects with any accuracy, even with
the aid of well-trained specialists. In reality, getting drawn into competitive
bidding for an FDI project is like sending government officials to an auction to
bid on an item whose actual value to the country is largely a mystery.
As the winning host country generally is the one with the most optimistic
assessment of the project's value to the country, incentive competition can
give rise to over-bidding, the so-called "winner's curse". For example, if a
country offers $185 million in incentives to obtain an FDI project that brings
$135 million in total benefits, the country as a whole is $50 million worse off
with the FDI project.
2.3.5.3. Political Economy Considerations
Lack of knowledge is not the only reason a government might offer an amount
of incentives that exceeds the benefits of FDI. The benefits from a particular
FDI project are likely to accrue to certain groups within the economy, for
example, to a particular region or to workers fortunate enough to get jobs with
the affiliate while the costs of the investment incentives are likely to be spread
more equally across the society.
This different incidence of benefits and costs among groups in the host
country opens the door for politically influential special interest groups to lobby
the government to provide investment incentives which primarily benefit them,
but which are largely paid for by other groups. The previously mentioned
knowledge limitations simply open this door even wider.
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2.3.5.4. Introducing New Distortions
The discussion has assumed that the cost to a host country of providing a
million dollars worth of incentives is just a million dollars. This is overly
optimistic. Financial incentives must be financed, and taxes create their own
inefficiencies. Fiscal incentives are no better, and non-pecuniary (indirect)
incentives can be even worse. For example, granting a monopoly position to a
foreign firm allows the host government to escape direct budgetary outlays by
shifting the cost onto consumers in the form of higher than necessary prices.
Developing countries, in particular, may for budgetary or balance-of-payment
reasons feel compelled to utilise highly distorting incentives, such as
monopoly rights and guarantees against import competition to foreign
investment projects. In contrast, developed countries with "deeper pockets"
may offer straightforward financial grants with less distorting effects. This
asymmetry puts developing countries at an extra disadvantage when
competing for FDI, beyond a simple lack of deep pockets.
In summary, once the realities of using investment incentives to compete for
FDI are taken into account, it is very difficult not to conclude that the world
economy and the vast majority of individual countries would be better off with
a multilateral agreement that included limitations on the use of investment
incentives. Such incentives are no different from any other kind of subsidy
programmes and, as with most other kinds of subsidies, developed countries
(and in this case the largest developing countries) can out-spend the vast
majority of other countries.
Under very stringent conditions, investment incentives can correct for market
imperfections. But the reality is that the necessary knowledge is missing. The
programmes are very vulnerable to political capture by special interest
groups, and there is considerable scope not only for introducing new
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distortions, but also for redistributing income in a regressive way. The latter
effect is a particular concern since developing countries as a group are net
recipients of FDI.
2.4. Assessment
The performance of the developing economies is increasingly depending on
the quantity of the linkages between their economies and those of the outside
world (developed). A set of policies aimed at improving these linkages would
achieve a better investment relationship between host governments and
MNCs. It would harness the linkages' beneficial effects and contain the
problems they create.
Thus for the relationship between governments and MNCs to be a
harmonious one, governments should pursue investment policies which are
widely applicable and transparent to MNCs. The starting point to transparency
is privatisation, however other liberalisations pertinent. Needless to say,
privatisation increases and ensures private sector participation, which in turn
increases private investors' base. This increase would lead to capital inflow,
technology transfer and management expertise to the host country.
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CHAPTER THREE: MAKING PRIVATISATION WORK
3.1. The Role of Privatisation Agencies and Advisers
Privatisation agencies play an important role in the administration of
privatisation programmes (e.g. divestiture). Thus, governments establish
these agencies in order to: 1) maintain a complete registry of the social and
state capital available for privatisation, 2) to organise the sale of aggregated
shares representing the capital available for sale; and 3) to identify potential
strategic investors, negotiates and conclude contracts with strategic investors
(however, in some cases, the contract is subjected to Cabinet approval).
Generally, privatisation agencies assist potential buyers or investors through:
I. offering advice on specific investment opportunities, including
company profiles;
II. furnishing information on the existing legislation;
III. helping potential investors with identifying companies seeking
investment and arranging contacts with potential partners;
IV. providing information on the blocks of shares which will be available
for sale through the Stock Exchange; and
v. conducting direct negotiations with strategic investors.
However, where privatisation agencies lack the capacity to execute certain
privatisation transactions, external advisers could be hired. In most cases this
will be an accounting firm, a bank or an advisory body to design specific
outreach and information activities.
3.2. Divestiture Process
Ideally, in the process of divestiture, investors enter bids to purchase the state
assets or simply SOEs, with the winner being selected based on, among other
things, evaluation of management skills; financial resources and business
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plans. Usually successful bidders are expected to build the enterprise into a
profitable and productive venture which would contribute to tax revenue and
employment (in this regard, post divestiture regulation becomes crucial).
Furthermore, successful bidders pay a negotiated price to become new
owners and assume business. This frees up the government money formerly
spent supporting the company to be used more productively.
However, not all divestiture are without problems and dissatisfactions. In
countries where privatisation is seen as nothing but giving away national
assets (e.g. voucher privatisation in Russia), widespread distortions and
mixed feelings about divestiture usually arise (Stiglitz, 1999). Thus, to avoid
these, divestiture processes should be well planned and paced.
Consequently, the sequencing of divestiture is an important one because it is,
after all, the mode of divestiture which adds value to privatisation.
Furthermore, it is important that those in charge of divestiture document the
information on each SOE listed for divestiture. Once that has been done, the
mode of divestiture should be selected (e.g. competitive tenders). However,
which form the divestiture process take depends on the technique preferred
for a particular SOE. The techniques may take many forms, namely: the sale
of shares, either publicly or privately; and the formation of strategic
partnerships and alliances between the state and private sector investors
where venturing is necessary. It is important, however, that where the SOE is
moribund, be liquidated instead of being divested to private investors.
Upon the completion of divestiture, the employment of some workers will
usually be terminated, with government paying the applicable end-of-service
benefits. This permits investors to start with a clean slate and, most
importantly, to decide their own levels of staffing. However, the effects of
liabilities and retrenchments should be minimised in order to have less trade
offs.
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African countries' experience of divestiture has been a good one despite their
ailing economies and SOEs' heavy deficits. Seeking strategic partners with
abundant benefits facilitated this. Also setting a clear objective and
transparency in divesting SOEs made the process of divestiture less
cumbersome. Ghana for one has been very successful in doing this (GHANA,
2000). Zambia is one of African countries that have managed to divest its
SOE transparently and with minimised costs (Zambia Privatisation Agency,
2000a).
3.3. Techniques of Privatisation
The principal strategies for divestiture include public offerings, private
offerings and management and employees buy-outs. Public offerings are
appropriate for large privatisation. This technique is attractive because it
increases the local investor base and provides government with much-needed
funds in the short-term (Tanyi, 1997:79). However, due to acute asymmetries
of information, the absence of an appropriate mechanism for corporate
valuation, and the lack of stock exchanges in most African countries, this
technique can be found difficult to implement.
Private offerings are most appropriate for small and loss-making enterprises.
Because it involves private negotiations between the government and
potential buyers, it is susceptible to abuse. Consequently, a deliberate and
conscious effort towards transparency must be pursued. Without such
transparency, a new government, claiming that the ancien regime had
misappropriated the crown jewels, might feel inclined to reverse the
privatisation process (Ibid.).
Management and employee buy-outs involve offering tranches of stock to
eligible managers and employees. By owning a stake in the enterprise,
managers and employees are likely to align their personal interests with the
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long-term interest of the enterprise. Whereas employee participation should
be encouraged, the complete transfer of the enterprise to employees should
be exercised, if at all, with caution. To this, a wise option is to devote most of
the stock to managers and less to employees because managers know more
about the enterprise than employees do. And equally so, managers tend to
have a better financial base than employees.
3.3.1. Public Offering of Shares
Through public offerings the government invites applications for the shares at
a set price. Where the issue is oversubscribed, the shares are allocated
according to a rationing scheme that is determined by the government and the
underwriters (company that guarantees and sell shares on behalf of the
enterprise). Public offerings are attractive because they increase the local
investor base and generate revenue for the government in the short term.
However, in order for this technique to be effective, an efficient system of
corporate valuation should be in place. Both the selling government and
prospective investors must be in a position to ascertain the true market value
of the enterprise (Tanyi, 1997:80).
The absence of an efficient system of valuation limits the effectiveness of
public offerings. In Africa, for example, there are acute asymmetries of
information because of the unavailability financial and other price-sensitive
information about SOEs. Since some of these SOEs do not keep regular and
consistence financial records, independent evaluators should be hired for
valuation. However, although the enlisting of accounting firms to carry out
valuations is necessary, the market remains the most efficient indicator of
corporate behaviour and value (Tanyi, 1997:81). Therefore, an expert in
valuations should not only look at the accounting value but also to the
economic value of the assets.
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3.3.2. Private Offering of Shares
Private offerings differ from public offerings because the government
negotiates directly with a single investor or a group of investors. Private sales
are usually dependent on the factors of the individual SOE; government
preferences and interests on the SOE, and the judgement of the market for
the specific product. According to Tanyi (1997:83), the buyer's identity and
investment plan are critical for private sales. In terms of achieving equity
ownership among its diverse citizens, the government may consider such
attributes as race and ethnic dimension to ensure that buyers from a single
ethnic group do not acquire lucrative enterprises and not others.
Similarly, the government may want to ensure that buyers with the best
investment plan (i.e. capable of maintaining or creating jobs and boosting
development) prevail. Furthermore, it is important in private sales that the
government stipulates a minimum holding period for the shares acquired in
order to allow for proper performance evaluations. This is to avoid ill
performance and to a certain extent, the "crony capitalism syndrome".
It makes little sense that the privileged class is allowed to acquire shares and
pass them over outside the privileged class for profit or for corruption
purposes. Although such arbitrage activities can eventually lead to efficiency
in the secondary market, they validate the initial policy of selective
redistribution. Given that this method of divestiture is essentially private and
susceptible to abuse, a strong need for transparency is necessary.
3.3.3. Management and Employees Buy-outs
On the one hand, a management buy-out is when incumbent managers
acquire a controlling interest in the SOE. On the other hand, an employee
buy-out is when employees (outside the management) acquire a controlling
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interest in the company. Management and employee buy-outs can also be
combined. This has occurred in Zambia to fulfil privatisation objectives mainly
in small and medium sized enterprises (Zambia Privatisation Agency, 2000a).
According to theory of the firm, control without ownership is typically the
hallmark of managers. Managers are simply nothing but agents of
shareholders. To this, management buy-out reduces the agency problem. The
agency problem is inherent in the nature of principal-manager relationship.
The Agency Problem Theory (APT) assumes that managers do not always act
on the best interests of their principals (henceforth shareholders), but instead
seek to maximise their interests. Management buy-out therefore provides a
catalyst for reuniting ownership and control (Green, 1997: 119). Personal
stake encourages managers to be more committed to common goals, to work
harder and to be more innovative.
The rationale of management and employee buy-outs lies with, according to
Green (1997: 125), the four motivating factors linking ownership to personal
and organisational effectiveness, these includes:
I. self-interest, which provides the rationale for referring to ownership
as an incentive. Personal remuneration is more closely tied to
profits, which are affected by one's own actions and those of one's
colleagues;
II. mutuality, which gives one a sense of belonging and therefore,
increases staff cohesiveness;
III. responsibility, which is more attached to personal visibility, personal
job responsibility and personal accountability; and
iv. control, which makes one not to feel as being subjected to the
whims of parental control. This factor gives more intrinsic
satisfaction to managers than it does to employees, because of the
level of control employees may exercise as participant owners.
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Both management and employee buy-outs are important divestiture methods
which eliminate problems related to passing over the assets from public to
private hands. However, in order to optimise their effectiveness, they should
be well planned and assessed accordingly. Clearly, management buy-out is
likely to be more successful because managers generally would be in a better
financial position to buy stocks than would the employees. And also managers
possess detailed knowledge more than employees about the workings of the
enterprise.
3.4. Strategic Partnerships and Alliances
3.4.1. Introduction
The terminology used to describe the forms of co-operation strategies varies
widely. Keegan (1997:240) maintains that phrases such as collaborative
agreements, strategic alliances, strategic international alliances, and global
strategic partnerships (GSPs) are frequently used to refer to linkages between
enterprises to jointly pursue a common goal. As a result an alliance can take a
variety of forms, ranging from arm's-length contract to a joint venture.
Simply because of this varied interpretations of the term, it is necessary to
define a strategic alliance in terms of three characteristics it possesses. A
strategic alliance is therefore seen as two or more firms working together to
pursue a set of agreed upon goals but remain independent subsequent to the
formation of the alliance. Secondly, the partner firms share the benefits of the
alliance and control over the performance of assigned tasks. And finally, the
partner firms contribute on a continuing basis in one or more key strategic
areas [e.g. technology and products (Yoshino and Rangan, 1995:5)]. Thus,
strategic alliances are of a cooperative nature.
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Governments worldwide encourage and stimulate strategic alliances.
According to Mockler (1999:4), in cooperation with MNCs, governments use
strategic alliances in many ways: 1) to privatise SOEs while continuing to
profit from and to some degree control the business; 2) to attract capital while
nurturing local business; 3) to bring technology to their country, governments
like companies do not always have the technology they need (Freidheim,
1998:43); and 4) to improve overall economic performance quickly, especially
in developing countries, without entirely relinquishing control of SOEs to
foreigners.
Considering the rate at which marriages are taking place in the form of
alliances worldwide today, needless to say is that there is a growing euphoria
about alliances as a panacea to all efficiency problems both in public and
private enterprises. Given the ailing state of SOEs in developing countries,
many governments see foreign partnerships and alliances as feasible ways to
restructure their SOEs to become more productive and efficient parallel to
private enterprises. In the same vein, MNCs see partnerships and alliances
with governments giving them the opportunity to access foreign markets and
resources with fewer restrictions.
3.4.2. Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs)
Partnerships between public sector and private sector are increasingly
becoming the marriages of the future. They promise abundant benefits and
yet, amicable and harmonious relationship between the two. PPPs can be
defined as contractual relationships between governments and private sector
operators to share and divide responsibilities and risks in delivering a service
or developing infrastructure (Heymans and Schur, 1999:608). The enthusiasm
for PPPs rest on the idea that public sector is incapable of delivering alone,
and that PPPs would assist in realising resources from private sector in the
implementation of major development objectives (Hemson, 1998: 1).
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The PPP concentrate on 'direct private-sector' involvement through equity
investment in, and/or the management and operation of, infrastructure
facilities such as water, roads, power and so on. A range of different forms of
PPP may be identified along a spectrum of limited involvement (e.g. a
management contract) through full privately owned utilities (Department of
Finance, 1996:2). Furthermore, various PPP options move beyond the
contractual range whereby ownership of assets remains with the government,
to an ownership range where assets move into the private sector such as in
the case of franchises and leases (Kotze, Ferguson and Leigland, 1999:627).
Increasingly in PPPs, the emphasis on the private component and involves a
private contractor being responsible for various combinations of feasibility
studies, project financing, project construction, operation and management
and ownership. Thus, PPPs represent, to a greater extent, innovative
approaches to the problems of inertia and traditional methods used by
governments. Although privatisation in the sense of the sale of public assets
represents the most visible aspect of the commercialisation process, a
profound challenge to the conception of direct service delivery comes in the
field of government by contract.
According to Hemson (1998: 17) the commercialisation and privatisation of
government operations were not initially targeted as conservative
governments prioritised the large national state enterprises. Now they are
being organised around the slogan of 'value for money'. Privatisation of
utilities in the form of PPPs, as manifested by the British experience, can
therefore be very effective (Hemson, 1998).
In summary, creating efficient and effective PPPs requires deployed of
resources to the best use. However, placing service delivery on a commercial
footing may require considerable investment in human resources -
developing skills, introducing new management system and incentives,
changing the culture of the organisation and creating a sense of purpose and
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responsibility. Furthermore, a service provider must understand the market in
which it operates. A commercial approach is essential. This means a better
understanding of consumer needs, managing relationships and getting the
pricing and the product right. If there is an incentive of higher profits for higher
levels of service, then the service provider will be keen to develop the market
further, provided it is affordable to the consumers. Thus careful attention to
cost recovery is essential (Jackson and Hlahla, 1999:562).
3.4.3. Foreign Partners and Alliances
In instances where it is not acceptable to transfer an existing state enterprise
in its entirety to the private sector or where the nature or extent of a new
enterprise would require the involvement of the state, such an enterprise can
be managed by a partnership between the state and the private sector. A
partnership of this nature may have the benefit of reconciling private sector
approach to management with public sector strategic interest in such an
undertaking.
3.4.3.1. Franchises & Leasing
In this form of privatisation, the public corporation remains responsible for the
provision of specific goods and services, under specified contractual
obligations. The public corporation grants the private sector an exclusive
supply in a particular defined locality and retains control of the prices of goods
or services. The contract is granted for a specific time period. This gives the
public corporation the opportunity to review undertakers' performance. And
this way, better service delivery at low prices can be ensured, simply because
private undertakers operate at market rates which induces more market entry
and therefore competition.
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3.4.3.2. Management Contracts
In this form of privatisation, the SOE remains responsible for the prevision of
specific goods and services, but contracts with one or more private
undertakings to provide the goods or services, under specified conditions, and
at an agreed price. Such contracting can be justified if the public sector is not
able to undertake the service or activity or if the private sector can perform it
as or more efficiently or economically.
3.4.3.3. Transfer of Ownership: Minority & Majority Shareholding
The transfer of ownership depends on the motivation of governments. Some
governments privatise more than 51% SOE stake while others restrict the
transfer of SOE stake to 49% in order to retain control of the SOE. Privatising
51% of SOE stake to foreigners means giving effective control to outsiders
and this is found to be unacceptable to some governments.
However, many governments do not seem to be concerned about applying
one policy across the board. In the case of the former, governments may
decide to give away effective control to foreigners simply because it is
necessary for the efficiency of the enterprise. This would be the case with
highly indebted SOEs.
In the latter, partial privatisation may be warranted due to structural necessity.
That is, not to give up effective control because venturing and other forms of
partnerships may get the enterprise out of distress. To this end, three main
models of transfer of ownership motivations are identified: The British Model,
the Finnish Model, and the French Model.
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3.4.3.3.1. The British Model
This model is driven primarily by ideological reasons. It sought to rid the state
of the responsibility for the enterprise to be privati sed at almost any cost. The
preferred mechanism is market floatation. It has also been part of a policy of
"popular capitalism". As such, the privatisation has generally been priced
attractively in order to tempt the small shareholder to invest (African Finance
and Investment, 1997).
Governments who follow this model are likely to own less than majority
shares. Zambia has also followed the same model in order to assist potential
Zambian buyers with no funds to participate in the privatisation programme by
providing: deferred payment schemes, public flotations and ZPA Mortgage
Scheme for houses and deferral of payment for houses (Zambia Privatisation
Agency, 2000a).
3.4.3.3.2. The Finnish Model
This model is driven primarily by necessity. Following the collapse of the
former USSR, Finland faced a severe economic crisis. Unemployment rose
sharply, enterprises collapsed, the government deficit soared under the
burden of social security payment. The national banking system was in severe
difficulty. And the Finnish government was unable to bailout its troubled
industries.
Instead the Finnish government foresaw a need to attract sufficient capital to
enable the survival of the enterprises and sold all the SOEs interests (African
Finance and Investment, 1997). Clearly, this model aims at mobilising private
sector to takeover troubled SOEs. However, bidders should prove themselves
to have the capacity to reengineer these enterprises into viable profit making
business actors. The Finnish government has left the legacy. And like any
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other government faced with the same dilemma, giving up all the interests to
bailout its SOEs is inevitable.
3.4.3.3.3. The French Model
This model is driven not by the ideology or necessity. The pragmatic
motivation is one of a series of policy measures aimed at reaching the
economic goals. To this, the French government primarily wished to raise
capital to reduce the government-borrowing requirement (lbid.). Thus, this
model essentially keeps one's cake in order to eating it latter. Prior to
privatisation, core blocks of shareholders are put in place and then SOEs can
be sold to investors (particularly foreign investors). The purpose of this is to
ostensibly ensure that bidders have long-term commitment to the industry in
order to avoid problems related to the Anglo-Saxon malady of short-termism.
Due to the close, indeed incestuous, relationship between the French political
and business elite, the core shareholders ensure not only the security of
management, but also that the enterprises continued to follow French
government social objectives. South Africa follows the same model in the
privatisation plans for Denel; Eskom; Telkom and Transnet. The reason
behind the partial privatisation of these enterprises emanates from the trade
unions pressure to the government not to privatise more than 49% (to keep
the "silver family" at home).
In summary, the transfer of ownership is situational and will vary from country-
to-country. Some countries' enterprises can still perform better under the state
control and therefore a need to privatise the whole enterprise is neither
necessary nor desirable depending on the political atmosphere. Government
who follows the French model would do so in order to exercise effective
control of the enterprise by keeping majority shares.
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3.5. Assessment
To make privatisation work, each stage of privatisation should involve the
balancing of both economic and political goals. What is possible is also
shaped by the specifics of the business involved, and other country economic
circumstances, particularly those relating to the stage of development of
domestic financial markets. This panoply of factors determines the institutional
framework approach to the whole programme, that is, how to structure each
particular divestiture; the steps that need to be taken in preparation for sale;
and how to manage the sale and negotiations.
Some countries with unsophisticated capital markets have problems to pursue
privatisation by conventional equity sales. Selling SOEs to foreign buyers in
this case should be facilitated. This way, more FDI follow from the
involvement of foreign investors when they bring modern technology,
marketing and management skills.
Managing the sale process involves balancing two factors. The first is the
nature of the business in question, in particular its size and complexity, and,
not often appreciated, its attractiveness to potential buyers. The second is the
need of governments to be seen to have been fair, and, especially, not to
have undersold the "crown jewels".
Ensuring that the buyer is properly qualified may be important if the future
development of the company is a concern. In some cases, many aspects of
complex sales cannot be simplified to a cash price and for some business
there may be only one or even no buyers. Thus, pre-qualification of buyers,
pre-negotiation of tender conditions or simultaneous negotiation after tender
submission with more than one bidder offer solutions to combining a measure
of transparency with getting the best deal.
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CHAPTER FOUR: PRIVATISATION IN SOUTH AFRICA
4.1. Introduction
In South Africa, privatisation was initiated in the 1980s but this programme
could not be widely implemented by the former government. In the post 1980s
era, however, a resurgence of interest in privatisation came about as a
structural response to rapid population growth and low economic growth.
These conditions created "an invidious fiscal problem", whereby the
economy's capacity to yield tax revenue was out of step with the rise in
demand for public goods. Truu (1992: 103) argues that as some way of
resuscitating the national economy, privatisation policy in South Africa seeks
to make a virtue out of necessity.
Since 1994, the goals of restructuring have been broadly defined to address
the economic, social and political objectives of government, and have been
redefined from time to time. A discussion document by the Department of
Public Enterprises, which records the decisions arising from a Cabinet in
January 1995, lists the objectives of restructuring as follows:
I. to facilitate economic growth ("restructuring should be used to increase
competition and guard against monopolistic behaviour");
II. to fund the RDP ("through carefully targeted expenditure on
infrastructure ... [however] a situation of funding short-term current
expenditure out of the liquidation of assets ... must be avoided");
I". to create wider ownership in the South African economy ("restructuring
provides an opportunity for widely dispersed ownership ... restructuring
must redistribute wealth, boost the small and medium enterprise
sector, have sustainable affirmative action implications and facilitate
genuine black economic empowerment");
IV. to mobilise private sector capital ("international firms operating in
association with local companies ... bring to bear not only the
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management expertise and technology but also the credit standing and
ability to finance investment");'
v. To reduce state debt ("restructuring and privatisation proceeds may be
used to reduce state debt");
VI. to enhance the competitiveness of state enterprises ("individual state
enterprises should be ... positioned to access global resources and
markets, particularly in Southern Africa");
VII. to promote fair competition ("fair competition at factor and product
markets will promote new entrepreneurial activities and better
economic performance in the country"); and
viii. to finance growth and requirements for competitiveness ["there is an
inescapable demand for new financing through different forms of
domestic and foreign partnerships to promote the infusion of new
equity capital and especially technology ... it should be emphasised
that growing enterprises are essential to ensure job security for the
employed and to generate new employment opportunities for the
unemployed"] (Department of Public Enterprises, 1995).
On the issue of implementation, the government identified four processes,
which are:
Process 1: Assessment of various SOEs using a matrix and putting each of
them into one of three categories: Category 1, those that have an explicit
public policy (RDP or socially sensitive); Category 2, those that have public
policy dimensions (strategic, but not socially sensitive); and Category 3, those
that have no public policy dimensions (privatisation may be considered). This
category was subdivided between 'unprofitable' and 'profitable'. These
categories are summarised in table 3 overleaf.
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Table 3: Preliminary Categorisation of SOEs
Category 1 Category 2 Category 3
Clear Public Policy Public Policy: Strategic Non-public Policy
Eskom Denel Profitable
Telkom Petro net Sun Air
Spoornet Atomic Energy Board Autonet
SA Post Office Armsco Safcol
SABC Mossgas Alexkor
Portnet SAA Non-profitable
SARCC Strategic Fuel Fund Transkei Airways
Airports Co. Assoc Aventura
Air Traffic Soekor (Pty) Ltd Parcel Express (PX)
Navigational Services Abakor
Source: Restructuring Discussion Document, 1995, p.13, January.
Process 2: Consists of policy development in terms of sectors.
Process 3: Consists of reviewing such factors as: composition of Board of
Directors, vision and mission, performance and other factors of SOEs.
Process 4: Decisions affecting ownership, accountability, functions and
location in the public sector.
This initial restructuring approach was too limited, although the government
displayed commitment. Major SOEs were classified under category 1 and
category 2. Category 3 only had few, small and insignificant SOEs. Thus,
because of these limitations, this approach could not meet government
objectives which were to: facilitate economic growth; fund RDP; create wider
ownership (empowerment); mobilise private sector capital; reduce state debt;
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enhance the competitiveness of state enterprises; promote fair competition;
and finance growth and requirements for competitiveness.
Since the publication of the restructuring discussion document of 1995, there
have been a number of further elaborations of its objectives: the 1996 Growth
Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy, the 1996 National
Framework Agreement (NFA) and the 1999 Interministerial Cabinet
Committee on the Restructuring of State Assets (IMCC). Some objectives
may have been prioritised differently in the various documents, but little
difference exists in the overall statement of objectives, as shown in Table 4.
T bl 4 K Ob" f f v " p u D tsa e ey IJec rves rom anous olcy ocumen
IGEAR {1996l liNFA {1996l IIIMCC (1999) I
Introducing budget reform to Increasing economic growth Mobilising private sector
strengthen the redistribution of and employment capital and expertise
expenditure
Effecting a faster reduction in IMeeting basic needs I Ensuring wider participation
the fiscal deficit in the South African economy
Encouraging a competitive and Redeploying assets for growth Creating effective market
stable currency structures in the sectors
currently dominated by SOEs
Ensuring monetary Facilitating infrastructural Attracting foreign direct
consistency to limit inflation development by mobilising and investment
redirecting private sector
capital
Reducing tariffs to complement IReducing state debt I Reducing the public sector
industrial restructuring borrowing requirement
Introducing tax incentives for Enhancing competitiveness Enhancing the efficiency and
new competitive investment and efficiency of state effectiveness of SOEs
and labour absorption enterprises
Accelerating the restructuring Financing growth and Financing growth and
of state assets to optimise requirements for requirements for
investment resources competitiveness competitiveness
Expanding infrastructure Developing human resources Accessing globally
investment to address service competitive technology
deficiencies and backlogs
Ensuring appropriate flexibility
II Iin labour markets
Funding skills training
II Icommensurate with needs
Expanding trade and
II Iinvestment in Southern Africa
Implementing stable and co-
II Iordinated policies
Source: Department of Public Enterprises, 2000, 10 August.
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Table 4 shows a remarkable consistency among the main objectives of
restructuring and other state industrial and economic policies. The more
recent objectives have become more specific about the manner in which the
competitiveness and growth of the South African economy can be promoted,
in particular the references to attracting FDI, creating effective market
structures and accessing globally competitive technology. While these latter
concerns reflect the changing perceptions of government's overall strategic
needs, the government has not abandoned or in any way de-emphasised its
earlier objectives.
4.2. Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR)
In June 1996 the South African government released GEAR strategy, which
set out its macroeconomic plan. GEAR addresses the role of the state in the
economy vis-a-vis that of private sector. Easy to notice in GEAR is the
attempt to shift the state more towards to a lean and mean model. GEAR also
stresses that government should not focus on owning assets or manufacturing
enterprises. Rather, the government should focus on regulating the economy,
instead of being an owner or producer; encouraging foreign investment by
providing an investor friendly climate; and cutting back on fiscal expenditure
[see table 4] (Polity, 1996a).
GEAR advocates that privatisation should be part of the macroeconomic
policy. This is quite simply because the success of the plan depends, largely,
on the sound partnership between the government and the private sector
(Ibid.). Without this combine drive, Flint (1997) maintains that South Africa will
remain vulnerable to adrift towards a bureaucratic and corrupt form of
government, which characterised most of Africa's post-colonial experience.
Realising the peril of Africa's post-colonial experience, GEAR prepares the
South African economy in the 21st century to become: a competitive fast-
growing economy, which creates sufficient jobs for all work seekers; a
redistribution of income and opportunities in favour of the poor; a society in
which sound health, education and other services are available to all; and an
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environment in which homes are secure and places of work are productive.
To this end, it is believed that this integrated economic strategy will
successfully confront the challenges of meeting basic needs, developing
human resources, and increasing participation in the democratic institutions of
civil society and implementing RDP in all its facets (Polity, 1996a).
The strategy projects that a growth rate of 6 percent per annum and job
creation of 400,000 per annum will be achieved by the year 2000 with more
concentration on capacity building to meet the demands of international
competitiveness. To achieve these, several inter-related developments are
called for: accelerated growth of non-gold exports; a brisk expansion in private
sector capital formation; an acceleration in public sector investment; an
improvement in the employment intensity of investment and output growth;
and an increase in infrastructural development and service delivery making
intensive use of labour-based techniques (Ibid.).
However, the expansion envisaged in the above aggregates is substantial and
entails a major transformation in the environment and behaviour of both the
private and the public sectors if, at all, we are to get there in the near future.
With no doubt, this would require rigorous steps to implement enabling
structures for a competitive platform in order to attain a powerful expansion by
the tradable goods sector; a stable environment for confidence and a
profitable surge in private investment; a restructured public sector to increase
the efficiency of both capital expenditure and service delivery; new sectoral
and regional emphases in industrial and infrastructural development; greater
labour market flexibility; and enhanced human resource development (Ibid.).
Against this background, it is clear that the success of the strategy to sustain
growth on a higher plane requires transformation towards a competitive
outward-oriented economy. The South African government already is trying
tirelessly to accomplish this. Worldwide evidence shows that economically,
successful countries have allowed the private sector to be at the forefront of
economic activity while the government's participation is limited to providing
collective goods and services. The restructuring of state assets through
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privatisation and outsourcing therefore becomes an important factor of
economic management to lessen the extent to which government absorbs
funds that can be applied more optimally in the private sector.
There is no doubt that investment in social and economic infrastructure also
plays an important role in increasing the productivity of labour and business in
this regard, which would be the drive to the attainment of a higher growth.
However, at present, South Africa faces a backlog in infrastructure
exacerbated by inefficient and highly indebted state enterprises. This, in itself
is a hindrance to growth. To confront these problems, privatisation is seen by
the government as a better and viable option. The government motivated that
privatisation would ease problems in the public sector of: finance, inefficiency,
and black empowerment.
4.2.1. Finance and Public Sector Inefficiency
The government argued that there is no enough money to build and maintain
the infrastructure that is needed. Therefore, by privatising, the government
seeks to invite private sector fund for building the needed infrastructure. And
by selling off state assets the government hopes to cut back on annual
expenditure and raise money to payoff past debts (ILRIG, 1999:32). The
government is also of the position that because of problems related to waste;
corruption and lack of efficiency in the public sector, to continue operating
state enterprises efficiently with maximum economic use of resources and
delivering effective services will be difficult.
4.2.2. Black Empowerment
In terms of black empowerment a number of proposals have been put
forward. One of the government's proposals has been to ensure that any
sales of state assets go to black owners such as empowerment consortiums,
wherein between 5% to 10% of any state parastatal is to be allocated to the
National Empowerment Fund (NEF), which excludes Cosatu's investment
company, Kopano stake and black empowerment investment companies
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(Sigcau, 1999/02/16). This way, privatisation is supposed to redress the
inequalities of apartheid.
A second proposal is to outsource or sell off SOEs to workers. Outsourcing
services to workers is a good method of privatisation intertwined with
empowerment. Alternatively, workers can acquire shares in the form of
employee share option programmes (ESOPs). With these shares, workers
gain more control over the enterprise since this allow them to participate
directly both as employees and owners.
Another way of empowering black workers proposed is the selling off SOEs to
trade unions investment companies (e.g. Cosatu's investment company). This
process of privatisation is intended both to empower workers through
investment companies while at the same time promoting a harmonious
relationship between employers and employees.
4.2.3. Corporate Governance
Enshrined in GEAR is that state entities should have appropriate regulatory
policies or proper corporate governance of all state entities to ensure decisive
leadership by government, which includes: a formulation of dividend policies,
together with clear indications of the objectives and performance appraisal
norms for all agencies; a revised policy regarding government guarantees;
and appropriate regulatory policies, aimed at ensuring that pricing policies are
fair and fully recover operating costs, while also promoting competition or
protecting consumers against monopolistic practices.
4.2.4. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
GEAR must be seen within the ambit of attracting foreign invest since real
growth, as projected in GEAR, will be stimulated by a broad private sector
investment (Polity, 1996a). The architectures of GEAR realised that increased
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openness to international trade and capital flows is one of the hallmarks of the
more rapidly growing developing economies worldwide.
And behind this trendy massive growth are the benefits FDI brings in the
economy. As mentioned before, FDI may come in several ways, among
others, modern technology transferred through investment flows;
management expertise and high level training in the company of international
investment projects; access to international sources of finance; and access to
global markets (Polity, 1996a: appendix 12).
4.3. The National Framework Agreement (NFA)
The debates over economic policy between government, labour and business
culminated in the general agreement that the state needed to be restructured.
The debates were mainly around and often touching key issues such as when
the restructuring of the state would take place and who would make the
decision about the restructuring? Business wanted the state to step aside and
provide more opportunities for the private sector. Unsurprisingly though as
business generally prefers a lean and mean state role in the economy.
Labour on the other hand, preferred a developmental state with increased
service provision. This is in line with labour needs, as quite often rank and file
prefers better service delivery that cost less in order to retain more disposable
income, which also mean more personal savings. However, in South Africa,
the concern goes deeper than that. Slogans about service provision also call
onto the government to redress apartheid backlogs in areas such as housing,
health, education and welfare.
Endlessly, some groupings with labour still continue to promote the policy of
nationalisation of certain privately owned companies and industries. Congress
of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and its affiliates perpetually hold
demonstrations and other actions in response to privatisation proposals.
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In 1995 the conflicts and debates between government and labour on the
issue of privatisation ended up with finalising the National Framework
Agreement. This was signed through National Economic Development and
Labour Council (NEDLAC) by COSATU, the Federation of Unions of South
Africa (FEDUSA), and the National Council of Trade Unions (NACTU) as well
as the Government of National Unity.
Under the terms of the NFA, all restructuring plans are debated by
representatives from government, the relevant union and the company itself.
The NFA facilitates the setting up of a number of joint structures of
government and labour, and discussions on the plans of restructuring. Thus,
the purpose of NFA is to facilitate a negotiated restructuring through a
collective bargaining process in terms of the Labour Relations Act of 1995.
Important to note, considering the controversy over privatisation, is that NFA
was the first occasion on which the government and organised labour
successfully negotiated around the policy of privatisation. Given the volatility
of South African organised labour opposition to the policies of privatisation,
this was a great achievement in terms of government-labour negotiation about
privatisation. This was quite simply due to government efforts to concede to
labour needs while at the same time attempting not undermine the
effectiveness of the privatisation programme and its potential vast contribution
to the economy.
To this end, government concretised some of the objectives in its so called
"six pack" programme, namely: belt tightening; reprioritisation of state
expenditure; restructuring of state assets and enterprises; restructuring of the
public service; building new inter-governmental relations; and developing an
internal monitoring capacity for this programme (Umanyano, 1996). This move
manifests government commitment, which in many ways satisfies labour, to
the continuation of its effective role in productive sectors of the economy. This
also shows that restructuring is not necessarily geared towards reducing state
involvement in any economic activity.
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Therefore, the NFA can therefore be seen in the context of achieving common
consensus on the agreed mode of restructuring based on the following
principles:
4.3.1. Re-orientate and Enhance Public Sector Efficiency
The purpose of restructuring state assets is to re-orientate and enhance the
public sector's ability to meet the challenges and requirements identified by
the RDP. In this context, the enterprise can play an important role in achieving
transformation and transition goals as set out in the RDP, which should inform
decision-making. (Polity, 1996b).
4.3.2. Labour
Organised labour in general and employees of the relevant public enterprises
should participate in policy formulation processes. Since the ultimate aim of
restructuring is to improve the quality of life of all South Africans, NFA ensures
that the underlying approach of restructuring does not occur at the expense of
the workers in state enterprises. Thus, every effort should be made to retain
employment. Furthermore, it is in the core of NFA that where restructuring
potentially has negative consequences for workers, a social plan must be
negotiated with the relevant unions at the enterprise level, which would take
account of the worker's interests.
Workers who may be redeployed within or between state enterprises shall
therefore enjoy equivalent benefits and conditions of employment as they
enjoyed in their previous employment. Furthermore, a coherent and common
set of principles need to be developed and applied by government to the
structuring of pension and provident funds which are already undergoing
massive restructuring. These principles take into account the fundamental
changes to SOEs configuration, which would follow the restructuring.
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4.3.3. Historically Disadvantaged Groups
Restructuring must redistribute wealth, boost the small and medium enterprise
sector, have sustainable affirmative action implications and facilitate genuine
black economic empowerment. The capacity of the historically disadvantaged
communities to participate and benefit fully in the restructuring programmes
should be ascertained and enhanced. NFA also pays special attention to the
needs of entrepreneurs, and the role, which pension and provident funds
could play in broadening ownership. In addition investment decisions and
asset dispensation of SOEs in the context of overall economic policy rather
than piecemeal equity transfers are key elements in achieving the
restructuring elements above.
4.3.4. Transparency in Participation
All key stakeholders should be full participants in the policy formulation
process, Boards of Directors and other appropriate decision making structures
at an agreed level. It was agreed that the policy formulation process should be
transparent in all respects. And the agreement should be reached on the
procedures for the conveying and protection of commercially sensitive
information and operations.
The structure of the NFA is based upon a three-tired structure, with each tier
serving a specific function or task.
Tier 1: Provides that government and labour should recognise each other's
right to establish its own structures. The government has established Sectoral
Task Teams to examine the restructuring options. The Task Teams (TIs)
prevail until their reports are produced. Thereafter, the Sectoral Minister's
Sub-Committee will take over.
Tier 2: Provides that the set up of the strategic implementation level in terms
of the NFA. The composition will comprise a core of 6-a-side from labour and
government but others will be drawn in as and when required. Appropriate
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sub-committees and ad hoc committees will be formed as and when
necessary. This NFA structure will continue to prevail until the NFA terminates
as envisaged.
Tier 3: This is comprised of the Boards of Directors as mandated by the
Cabinet and a Labour/Management Committee (Polity, 1996b).
4.4. Restructuring Policy Framework
At a Lekgotla on 29 November 1999, IMCC directed that a policy framework
be prepared to guide the restructuring process into the 21st century. On 10
August 2000, the restructuring policy framework was launched. It provides a
more comprehensive framework than has existed to date, in order to ensure a
consistent approach to restructuring across government and to address
perceived market uncertainties about government's restructuring priorities. To
this end, the policy framework address these requirements by focusing on:
I. government's vision for restructuring;
ii. the economic and social effects of restructuring;
iii. promoting appropriate regulatory and competitive frameworks;
IV. promoting empowerment and broadening participation in
restructuring;
v. improving corporate governance and ensuring improved ethics and
probity;
vi. improving the restructuring process; and
vii. the four key enterprises (Department of Public enterprises, 2000).
Significant to this policy framework is its aim to provide government, SOEs
and stakeholders with a common frame of reference, integrating and
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reconciling the various objectives for restructuring as championed by the
different stakeholders concerned with SOEs. Although the policy framework
seeks to reconcile the different objectives, it remains true that different
stakeholders will seek to emphasise different objectives at the expense of
others.
In this case, trade unions and the wider society may be discontent because
management and boards are usually more concerned with improving
business efficiency and effectiveness, which will undoubtedly ensure better
service delivery and better investment values, thus also meeting macro-
economic and social objectives. Nevertheless, other stakeholders who value
the latter objectives more highly, may be less enthusiastic about realising
improved business performance, especially if they believe that this will occur
at the expense of realising their priorities.
The policy framework has managed to gather a general agreement about how
the restructuring process should be improved in order to ensure that the
accelerated agenda could be achieved. The department has been consulting
participants involved in previous and current restructuring initiatives to gather
suggestions, which include the following: arrangements to improve
stakeholder involvement could take advantage of the LRA and Social Plan
and the NFA to address high-level political engagement; the Department of
Public Enterprises would lead the restructuring of SOEs and co-ordinate the
activities of policy departments and finance through a number of sector-
specific programme officers; and the roles and responsibilities of government
and the boards and management of SOEs in the restructuring process should
be identified and then clarified by the proposed shareholder compact and a
revised protocol on corporate governance.
It is envisaged in the policy framework that the majority of the restructuring
activities will be completed by 2004. Cabinet has instructed the Department of
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Public Enterprises to give priority to the restructuring of the four largest SOEs,
namely: Eskom, Transnet, Telkom and Denel. These SOEs comprise
approximately 91 per cent of estimated total assets, provide 86 per cent of
turnover and 94 per cent of net income and employ 77 per cent of all
employees in the top 30 SOEs. While it can be expected that the estimated
300 other public enterprises can obviously contribute to meeting government
objectives on restructuring, these four companies will have the greatest
impact.
With the exception of the four large SOEs, the Post Office and Sapekoe,
which also have large employee complements (making up 91 per cent of the
top 30 companies), the number of employees affected by the restructuring of
the other SOEs is not particularly significant. Given that the proportion of
employees in SOEs only accounts for approximately 5 per cent of non-
agricultural employment, apart from the six large employers identified in the
table above, the restructuring of SOEs is unlikely to have a major impact on
overall employment trends. It should be noted, however, that enterprises such
as Eskom, Transnet and Telkom have a developmental role to play in addition
to promoting economic growth. Other restructuring initiatives includes:
I. Safcol: The sale of three packages is being concluded; the remainder
will be consolidated and re-offered.
II. Information technology consolidation: Options for the consolidation of
the information technology capabilities of Datavia, Ariel Technology
and Eskom are being assessed.
III. Alexkor: A turnaround strategy is being effected with a strategic
management partner.
IV. Aventura: A turnaround strategy is being effected with a strategic
management partner; this will be followed by the sale of the entity.
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v. Post Office: A turnaround strategy is being effected with a strategic
management partner.
VI. Sentech Signal Distribution: The Department of Communications is
undertaking a study into a restructuring strategy for the entity.
vii. SOE property portfolio: The property portfolios of Denel, Eskom and
Propnet are being studied with a view to identifying restructuring
options (Department of Public Enterprises, 2000).
These restructuring initiatives will enable the government to maximise the
effects of the restructuring programme. As it has been showed above, other
SOEs will be restructured concurrently with the major four enterprises. All
restructuring proposals are, however, subject to Cabinet approval.
4.5. The Role of the Ministry for Public Enterprises
The Department of Public Enterprises is responsible with co-ordinating and
leading the restructuring process, while the Minister reports to Cabinet on
restructuring. Its programme officers for specific sectors, however, work with
the primary policy departments. Government noted that policy, regulation and
shareholder functions are intertwined and that there is also a need for
integration of key issues.
Thus, before the restructuring of any SOE, a strategic analysis is conducted.
Strategic analysis involves developing a list of restructuring priorities from an
analysis of the SOE information collected in the SOE database maintained by
the monitoring unit. This list is also defined through reference to an SOE
operating environment report (comprising macroeconomic, sectoral and
legislative and regulatory reviews).
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Once the set of restructuring priorities has been defined, the Department
requests a restructuring plan from the SOE concerned. This plan is assessed
against the SOE operating environment report and updated by the SOE
where necessary. Stakeholder engagement takes place around the
restructuring plan and once an acceptable plan has been developed, Cabinet
approval is sought.
The Department receives the high-level restructuring plan after Cabinet
approval and appoints advisers who prepare a detailed restructuring plan.
This process will largely involve due diligence research and the identification
of appropriate restructuring mechanisms. There will also be stakeholder
involvement around the detailed restructuring plan, which is then approved by
Cabinet.
After receiving Cabinet approval for the detailed restructuring plan, a detailed
work plan is formulated. The Department then moves into the transaction
management phase where it largely project manages the process. Cabinet
approval is sought for the portfolio of potential bidders, the portfolio of
potential buyers and, finally, the selected purchasers, after which the deal is
concluded and then proceeds are collected.
4.6. Privatisation Advisers
Privatisation advisers play an important role in the privatisation process of
South Africa. Since the Department of Public Enterprises is responsible with
co-ordinating and leading the restructuring process, it also appoints
privatisation advisers who prepare a detailed SOE's restructuring plan. This
process involves, as mentioned before, due diligence research and the
identification of appropriate restructuring mechanisms.
The aim of the government is to utilise advisers in restructuring the
restructuring of SOEs in a cohesive manner. As the Department of Public
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Enterprises' representative, Zaid Nordien, said: "we need to be able to assess
whether the advice is in our best interests. We will get specialists where we
need external advice, but we also need the capacity to investigate options
placed before us" (Mail & Guardian, 1999/11/10).
This can be seen in a move aimed at speeding up the privatisation and
restructuring of state assets. In November 1999, the Department of Public
Enterprises decided not to renew its contract with the banking group HSBC
Simpson McKie, the government's adviser on privatisation for three years.
The reason being that the department wants to expand its own internal brains
trust on privatisation and recruit separate advisers for specific sell-off
transactions rather than have a single catch-all adviser (Ibid.).
The Department maintained that HSBC's departure fitted in with the
government's plans to step up its privatisation drive, which was likely to
include the sale of R170-billion in state assets by 2004. HSBC SA remains
predominantly a securities business. It has good corporate finance and
improving mergers and acquisitions businesses, as well as its fledgling asset
management business (Financial Mail, 2000/06/16).
Regardless of HSBC's reputation, the government realised that relying on one
adviser would not be in line with its needs for restructuring because the
adviser could serve a number of different clients. HSBC was appointed under
the former Minister of Public Enterprises, Stella Sigcau, on a R12-million a
year contract in 1996 after much debate over whether the Department of
Public Enterprises needed a catch-all adviser or separate sectoral advisers.
4.7. The IFe in South Africa
The International Finance Corporation is notorious for its pro-development
programmes with the prime aim of fostering economic growth in the
developing countries by financing private sector investments, mobilising
capital in international financial markets, and providing technical assistance
and advice to governments and businesses. In partnership with private
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investors, IFC provides loan and equity finances for business ventures in
developing countries and helps them to stimulate the flow of savings and
investment. IFC plays a catalytic role by demonstrating the profitability of
investments in developing countries. And it further promotes economic
development by working to build efficient capital markets.
In South Africa IFC is focusing its financial and advisory activities in four
important areas. First, it supports job creation through the financing of
greenfield investment projects, restructuring and modernisation of small and
medium scale enterprises, providing ready access to finance and, in general,
supporting entrepreneurship. Secondly, IFC invests in the establishment or
expansion of venture capital and private equity funds particularly geared to
the needs of the small business sector, including in particular businesses
owned by previously disadvantaged groups. Thirdly, IFC provides advisory
and financial support for private provision of infrastructure in townships and
former homelands. And lastly, it supports projects with a strong regional
integration impact (International Finance Corporation, 1999).
Since resuming activities in South Africa in 1994, IFC has invested in 25
projects, approving $118.7 million in financing. The cumulative cost of these
projects is around $809 million. Fifteen of these investments have been less
than $1.5 million or equivalent. Through small project programme, IFC has
financed the creation of new businesses as well as the expansion,
modernisation, and diversification of existing ones. These financing sources
are illustrated in table 5.
Table 5: International Finance Corporation in South Africa
FINANCING SOURCE $US
MILLIONS
IFC Loan 15.19
IFC Equity 88.15
IFC Quasi-equity 12.12
IFC 115.46
IFC Loan Syndication Programme 3.30
TOTAL 118.76
Source: International Finance Corporation, 1999c, p.1, January.
81
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Other recent noteworthy investments in South Africa include a $35 million
stake in a $290 million Private Equity Fund and, at the other end of the scale,
a $1 million investment in a joint venture with Business Partners to create a
new Business Incubation Centre which will help very small companies by
providing secure workspaces and service facilities. After maintaining a low
profile in SA for the past four years, head of the SA regional office, Vincent
Rague in 1998 maintained, "the initial thrust was to support the
transformation. But now our investment philosophy is it must be seen to bring
in direct investment" (Financial Mail, 1998/10/30).
It is clear that IFC is significantly expanding its programme in South Africa to
support the government's nascent economic recovery programme. The IFC
maintains that despite a stagnant economy, South African still offers a good
opportunity for investors ranging from direct and portfolio investors. As shown
by the figures in the table previously, IFC has invested in technical assistance
trust funds for new investments in sugar processing, prefabricated housing,
paper, printing, and equity funds (International Financial Corporation Annual
Report, 1999:5).
However, the IFC will not offer advice to South Africa on issues concerning
privatisation and huge projects despite the fact that South Africa's
privatisation approach is supported by the IFC (Udemans, 1996: 101). South
Africa favours a top-down approach as opposed to a bottom-up approach,
which, according to Donaldson (1995: 1) is favoured by governments that
appear to be suspicious about the ideas and philosophies of privatisation and
its benefits.
In many ways, South African thinking is more akin to the French thinking,
namely that the state should remain a majority shareholder when foreign
partners are involved, and a private majority only in cases where partners are
domestic. However, unlike the French model which prefers domestic
restructuring, the South African model, in line with IFC thinking, instead
prefers foreign investors, but then only as majority partners, apparently to
forestall the possibility of some private sector monopolies increasing in size.
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Another similarity to the IFC model is the preference of foreign, rather than
domestic financing (Breytenbach, 1999b:2).
One of the reasons why the South African government does not prefer the
IFC in its privatisation is because of the internal complexities related to
restructuring. The rationale quite simply being that the IFC would ignore
important issues that matter to the majority of South Africa such as: poverty
alleviation, black empowerment, job losses and other social macroeconomic
issues of value to the country (Bond, 1997).
4.8. Assessment
Privatisation in South Africa has changed dramatically in few years. But the
government has largely failed to sell itself as a success story to international
investors. This is due in part to the fact that privatisation has not been the
driver of positive sentiment that it should have. Contradictory objectives, the
lack of a comprehensive policy framework and the poor handling of the
process has left investors confused and increasingly uninterested.
The only three successful privatisations were also only partial privatisations.
The only three medium-sized full privatisations - Sun Air, Alexkor and
Aventura - were disasters. The last two ended up back in state hands and
another state enterprise nailed Sun Air, the full story of which we have yet to
hear. Other attempts such as Mossgas just simply disappeared from the radar
screen with not a bleep being heard again. Basically South Africa has seen a
lot of the pain in the restructuring process and very little of the benefits. Job
losses, uncertainty, and broken promises (WOZA, 2000/08/16).
But not everything the state-owned enterprises have done have been costly to
the economy. Some of the benefits have in recent years been social in nature
such as the millions of people who got electricity and water for the first time.
Nonetheless the benefits could be greater if by the sale of parastatals South
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Africa were to reduce state debt and the resulting savings can be put to use
via better state services such as better policing, hospitals and lower taxes.
Privatisation must not be seen as a panacea to South Africa's structural
problems, but as a saleable commodity that can bring swift economic benefits
through the more efficient management of key parastatals (Opinion &
Analysis, 1999/12/13).
Privatisation of significant assets as set in the policy framework is the best
way to draw in more FDI - funds that go into building factories, buying
machinery or increasing, in some other way, South Africa's ability to produce
goods and services. In addition, privatisation can do a lot to pull in real
investment from abroad - as opposed to portfolio investment, which comes
and goes.
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CHAPTER FIVE: PRIVATISATION IN ZAMBIA
5.1. Introduction
Zambia was one of the heavily state-run economies in Africa and by the late
1980s most SOEs were over staffed and draining money from the Treasury.
Gedeon Njoko, a representative for the World Bank in Zambia, says:
"People used to joke that in Zambia there's a parastatal for everything, and if you're
not careful they will set up for you to breathe. They were like day care centres for
adults. It wouldn't have made a difference to the economy if the staff didn't turn up
for work" (Zambia Privatisation Agency, 1999: 1).
In 1991, the Zambian government embarked on a massive privatisation
programme, at a time when over 80 percent of the country's economy was
comprised of parastatals (Mail & Guardian, 1998/02/13). A special agency,
Zambia Privatisation Agency, was established under the Privatisation Act in
1992 to plan, implement and control the privatisation of SOEs. The creation of
the agency can be viewed as the most important aspects of the institutional
set-up required to start the programme, there were a number of other
measures that had to be taken before the programme could start (Fundanga
and Mwaba, 1997:10). The parastatals were a huge burden on the
government in terms of subsidies, and consequently privatisation has become
one of the priority areas of government policy. The process is regulated by the
Privatisation Act (1992).
The second wave of privatisation began In early 1998, involving the
privatisation of telecommunications, utilities, energy, postal services, mines
and properties. Smaller entities were privatised first to gain experience and by
March 1998, 215 companies (out of a portfolio of 321) and 198 commercial
properties had been sold. Early in 1998, the President of Zambia made a
reaffirmation on the sale of SOEs in the sectors of transport (e.g. National
Airports Corporation), energy and utilities (e.g. Zambia Electricity Supply
Corporation), property (e.g. ZIMCO properties), finance (Zambia National
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Commercial Bank) and others including the Zambia Telecommunications
Company, Ndola Lime and the gemstone industry (Zambia Investment
Centre, 2000:6).
The privatisation of the huge Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM) has
been a success. The parastatal has been unbundled into nine operating
packages. ZCCM retains a minority shareholding plus a golden share that
ensures that the government has a strategic interest in the various mines.
ZCCM is listed on the London Stock Exchange and has a market
capitalisation of USD400m. The privatisation of mines alone was scheduled to
generate USD2.8bn over the period of five years (Zambia Privatisation
Agency, 2000a).
In September 2000, Zambia has managed to privatise 244 of its 312 SOEs
(Zambia Privatisation Agency, 2000c). And more impressively, at the time, the
ZPA is currently working on the privatisation of the following nine companies:
I. Kariba Minerals Limited, a main large scale amethyst producing and
exporting company in Zambia. ZPA is inviting offers for the immediate
sale of 87% GRZ and LONHRO Africa shareholding in one of the
world's largest amethyst deposits;
ii. Kafue Textiles of Zambia (KTZ), a large and versatile textile
manufacturing complex. ZPA is inviting offers for the immediate sale of
KTZ;
III. Lundazi Castle, the only castle hotel in the country, built between 1949
and 1952 and is now a national monument. The hotel is to be
privatised by way of a fixed term concession;
IV. Nitrogen Chemicals of Zambia (NCZ), a large fertiliser manufacturing
company, also engaged in trading of manufactured products;
v. Zambia State Insurance Corporation (ZSIC) Zambia's premier
insurance company engaged in providing all types of insurance - both
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life and non life. ZSIC is undergoing a restructuring programme and will
be available for privatisation once restructuring is completed;
vi. Mukuba Hotel a private owned hotel based on the Copperbelt of
Zambia, with a minority government shareholding. Government is to
divest its entire shareholding of 24% whilst the private shareholder will
also be offering 24% shares for sale;
vii. Zambia Telecommunications Company (ZAMTEL). Zambia's national
telecommunications services provider. A minority stake, with
management rights is to be offered;
viii. Zambia Railways (ZR), serves as an important mode of transportation
in a landlocked country. ZR is to be privatised by way of concessioning;
and
IX. National Airports Corporation (NAC), manages Lusaka International
Airport, Ndola, Livingstone and Mfuwe Airports. NAC's airports in
Livingstone, Ndola and Mfuwe are to be recapitalised and their terminal
operations will be offered for lease to the private sector (Zambia
Privatisation Agency, 2000d).
ZPA also wants to privatise the following SOEs in future:
I. Indeni Petroleum Refinery, the company's principal activity is the
processing of crude petroleum feedstock. A study is soon to be
commissioned on the options for sale of the Government's
sharehold ing.
ii. Zambia Postal Services Corporation (ZAMPOST), the largest provider
of traditional and modern postal services in Zambia. A study is soon to
be commissioned on the options for private sector involvement.
III. Zambia Electricity Supply Corporation (ZESCO), the state owned
electricity utility involved in generation, transmission and distribution of
electricity. Privatisation options study soon to be commissioned.
iv. Zambia National Commercial Bank (ZANACO), is one of the most
significant players in the Zambian banking market and has played a
major role in the market. 10 % of shares to be offered to the public
through the Stock Exchange (lbid.).
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The success of Zambia's privatisation programme can be attributed to
government commitment. The government is committed to invest its
resources in careful programme design and preparation. Privatisation Act,
legal authority vested in the ZPA which enables it to undertake its work with
minimum political interference and decisive steps to deal with constraints,
notably by addressing the weak capital market and eliminating the influences
of holding companies.
5.2. Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs)
The deepening of the development crisis in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), which
began in the 1970s and intensified in the 1980s, presented a difficult
challenge to the political leadership, policy advisers, and the development
community (Hope and Kayira, 1997:258). This challenge required new policy
measures to reverse the declining trends and place those economies on a
path of sustainable growth and development. Hope and Kayira go on to say
that there was a need to, among other things, arrest the deepening of poverty,
reduce the socio-economic inequalities, lighten the external debt burden,
reverse the brain drain, create new employment opportunities, improve the
efficiency of the physical infrastructure, narrow down the fiscal deficits, and
improve the balance of payment.
The policy response of this crisis emerged in the form of structural adjustment
programmes (SAPs). According to Riddell and Cockcroft (1991 :2), the long-
term objective of SAPs is to raise the productivity capacity of the economy
through macroeconomic and institutional intervention to create an
environment in which both domestic and foreign investment flourish. Policies
to create this environment have included low and deregulated wages and the
labour market and a deregulated (the withdrawal of the state from ownership
of firms, in pricing and marketing) and liberal policy environment (removing
bottlenecks to the entry and operation of goods, services and capital), in order
to attract FDI inflows into these countries (Abugre, 2000:4-5).
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These programmes were mainly formulated by and with the support of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in the early 1980s.
The reason why the policy response to the crisis came from the IMF and the
World Bank and not from the experiencing countries is quite simply that for
more than over a decade the IMF and the World Bank changed the form of
their aid for less developed countries from project driven to programme driven
(Strydom and Fiser, 1995:321). What this means is that instead of funding
particular development projects, they introduced lending programmes, which
were to be supported by policy and institutional reforms in less developed
countries.
And the reason why SAPs are prevalent in most SSA and not so much in
other developing countries is quite simply that on average, the economic
growth of SSA has been slower over the past thirty years than that of
comparable developing countries elsewhere (Engberg-Pedersen et ai,
1996:4). Many developmentalists attribute slow economic growth to a more
extensively and heavily state-controlled development process in SSA than in
other parts of the Third World. Consequently, this attribution is normally an
evaluation of piecemeal private business participation in most African
economies.
However, there are controversies regarding the prime reasons for the need to
implement SAPs in SSA. According to Coetzee (1993:79-80) some observers
regard the domestic economic woes and economic mismanagement of these
countries as the main problems underlying the economic crisis. Others regard
the external economic shocks as the main cause of their economic
predicament. Furthermore, others are of the opinion that Africa's economic
problems are the result of both external and internal problems, but that the
internal problems seem to predominate. Lastly, pre-eminent African scholars
increasingly support a view that Africa has very deep-seated socio-economic
and political problems and that nothing short of a total transformation will
elevate Africa to higher levels of development.
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SAPs initiated by the IMF and the World Bank since early 1980s are based on
three considerations. First, the supply side of the economy is emphasised.
Supply is to be expanded through economic liberalisation. Economic
liberalisation is linked to reducing the government's share in economic activity
through privatisation of state assets. Fiscal policy follows the fixed rules of a
balanced budget or a budget deficit maintained at a fixed percentage of GOP.
Secondly, foreign trade is believed to drive growth. The economy is
developed through outward looking export growth rather than inward looking
import substitution. Thirdly, it is assumed that economic resources are
allocated through relative price changes. Thus in order to secure these
allocative effects markets have to be liberalised and the economy deregulated
(Strydom and Fiser, 1995:322).
From the above it is clear that the philosophy underlying SAPs is the free play
of market forces with minimal or no participation by the state in economic
activities (Mensah, 1993:74). This is the belief of the IMF and the World Bank
in their conditionality for their lending programmes. "Because SAPs are
market oriented, their implementation brought an end to medium economic
planning. Annual budgets therefore become the only plan document. Market
orientation also means privatisation and/or commercialisation of public
enterprises and public sector services" (Mensah, 1993:75).
Clearly, structural adjustment lending of the IMF and the World Bank in this
case is non-project lending aimed at bringing about policy and institutional
change to modify the structure of the economy so that it can promote
sustained growth and maintain favourable balance of payments (Coetzee,
1993:80).
Against this background, why did Zambia implement SAP? It should be
realised that during the time of Kenneth Kaunda's regime, the first leader of
independent Zambia, huge investments were directed towards building a
strong public sector, which Kaunda believed was an important means of
improving the lives of the people. The Zambia economy is largely dependent
on cooper production. Throughout the 1960s, cooper prices remained high.
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As a result of this, the Zambian government was able to use the profits from
cooper to subsidise the expansion of schools, clinics and other services
(ILRIG, 1999:21).
But in the mid-1970s, the price of cooper fell on the world market. Zambia was
forced to borrow in order to continue to finance the developmental state.
However, when the price of cooper failed to rise again on the world market,
Zambia could not escape a serious debt crisis. With more that 90% export
income flowing from cooper, the extensive developmental state could not be
sustained. The problem was made worse by considerable corruption and
inefficiency in many of the state enterprises (Ibid).
Eventually, Zambia had no choice but to borrow from the IMF. This loan was
conditional. The condition was that the Zambian government should
implement SAP. Furthermore, one of the key conditions of the SAP was to
reduce the size of the public sector that has been built for about three
decades by Kaunda. This was to be done largely through privatisation.
Since the inception of SAP in the late 1991, a far-reaching structural reforms
have been implemented, including: the decontrol of agricultural prices and the
liberalisation of maize marketing; substantial progress on a comprehensive
parastatal reform and privatisation programme; the decontrol of interest rates,
the removal of exchange controls and the floating of the kwacha; the
liberalisation of the banking sector; and the removal of quantitative restrictions
on imports and exports, as well as the reduction of the level and dispersion of
customs tariffs (International Monetary Fund, 1999).
These reforms, coupled with efforts to pursue stable financial policies, have
somewhat improved Zambia's economic outlook considerably. Nonetheless,
economic performance was uneven, as several droughts and falling copper
production caused negative economic growth during 1991-95. As a result of
adverse weather conditions, the sharp decline in copper exports, and the
weakening of the financial position of the copper parastatal, real GDP
contracted by an estimated 2 percent in 1998 (Ibid.).
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The sharp decline of cooper exports is also related to the fact that cooper
mines are largely government owned and therefore very inefficient. Zambia
had more than 300 state-owned enterprises mostly cooper mines.
Furthermore, these also included most producers of goods such as sugar,
beer, cement, cigarettes, crushed stones, dairy goods, elevators, and fabrics
as well as providers of services such as transport, hostels, and cold storage
(IRIG, 1999:22).
The initiative by the Zambian government to privatise parastatals is therefore
seen in the light of attempting to improve and stimulate economic growth.
Today Zambia's privatisation programme is viewed as Africa's model. As
noted above, the SAP imposed by the IMF largely drove privatisation in
Zambia. In advancing privatisation, the IMF and its supporters had a number
of motivations. It was argued that private sector in Zambia was too big,
inefficient and corrupt. And that the only way to make these parastatals
efficient is if private sector motive of profit is instilled following privatisation.
The IMF and its supporters argued that Zambia could raise finance to tackle
its debt problem from privatisation.
5.3. Institutional Framework for Privatisation
Following the announcement of the policy on privatisation in May 1990, the
government in September 1990, set up a Task Force on privatisation. The
Task Force which submitted its report to the Minister of Finance in January
1991, recommended the creation of two organs: Steering Committee on
Privatisation; and Technical Committee on Privatisation. The Steering
Committee was to be responsible for policy issues on Privatisation while the
Technical Committee was to be responsible for the actual privatisation
activities. The Technical Committee was drawn from within the parastatal
sector.
To facilitate the process, the government moved quickly to pass the
necessary legislation. In July, 1992, the Privatisation Act (No:21 of 1992) was
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passed by Parliament. This Act established the ZPA as the sole institution
responsible for the divestiture of state enterprises. ZPA was to be governed
by a Board of Directors to be drawn from the Public and Private Sectors. The
agency was granted autonomy to determine how enterprises were to be
privatised and the prices to be paid for them. Cabinets' role was confined to
approval of the divestiture sequence. The Zambia Privatisation Act lists the
following, as modes of privatisation that can be employed in the divestiture
process:
I. public offering of shares;
II. private sale via negotiated and competitive bids;
III. dilution of government holding;
IV. sale of assets;
v. re-organisation of State-owned enterprises before sale of whole or part;
vi. management/employee buyout;
VII. lease and management contracts; and
VIII. any other method the agency many consider.
Following the enactment of the Act, the ZPA Board was appointed and it set
itself to work by appointing officers to run the agency. The old technical
committee was disbanded. The first task for ZPA was to draw up a long-term
Divestiture Sequencing Plan for approval by Cabinet. This comprised seven
tranches, the first of which comprised 20 mainly small companies which could
be easily analysed and disposed of through trade sales.
While the Zambia Privatisation Act and the creation of the agency can be
viewed as the most important aspects of the institutional set-up required to
start the programme, there were a number of other measures that had to be
taken before the programme could start. Most importantly, a large number of
legislative amendments were made in order to make it possible to sell some
of the state-owned enterprises, most of which also owned other assets
including land and residential properties. From 1995, things moved quickly so
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that by 1996 the World Bank was able to comment on the programme as
follows: "Zambia has the most successful privatisation programme to date and
the experience there offers many examples of best practice" (World Bank,
1995).
5.4. The Divestiture Process
Once the ZPA had started to work the first step in the privatisation process
was tranching. A tranche is defined as a group of companies selected to be
privatised within a given period of time. The selection of companies to various
tranches in Zambia has not been without controversy, and there has been a
shifting of companies between tranches over time. The first tranche as
already noted, consisted of very small companies that were selected mainly
for a test run (i.e. to test how the process of privatisation can be
implemented). Given that privatisation was being attempted for the first time
and the privatisation agency had not yet assembled a cadre of experts in
evaluation, this may have been a prudent action on the part of the
government. Although the tranches were proposed by ZPA, they were
ultimately approved by Cabinet, as required by the Privatisation Act. The
process of privatisation follows these steps:
i. tranching - approved by Cabinet;
II. technical and financial evaluation of company to fix the price and
recommend the mode of divestiture - done by Consultants;
III. ZPA decision on price and mode of divestiture;
IV. advertising and opening up of competitive bidding - by ZPA;
v. evaluation and short-listing of bidders - done by ZPA;
vi. negotiations - done by independent teams; and
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vii. signing of Heads of Agreement/Memorandum of sale by the Minister of
Finance.
Once a tranche of companies becomes eligible for privatisation the ZPA
undertakes detailed evaluation of all aspects of the company with the
assistance of independent consultants. These studies look at the state of
equipment and buildings, the production process, the work force, the industry
and the financial standing of the company. These studies establish the value
of the company which ZPA can use as a bench-mark against bids to be
submitted by intending buyers.
In the interest of transparency, the privatisation process involves extensive
public information work and ZPA spends substantially on advertisements to
call for consultants, advertise companies ready for sale, and inform the public
of the progress of the program. In its evaluation, ZPA ranks bidders on the
basis of the business development plans being proposed for the company, as
well as the price being offered. In reality, the business plan carries more
weight because the overall benefits to the nation can only be realised if a
company is sold to someone who is able to sustain its operations as well as
expand it.
ZPA uses independent negotiators mainly drawn from the Zambian public, but
are usually people of an appreciable level of competence in matters relating to
business and finance. Each team is composed of a chairman, a lawyer and an
official from ZPA whose main role is to record the proceedings of the
meetings. A negotiating team could be larger than the three people mentioned
depending on the complexity of the company to be sold. A representative of
ZIMeO, the holding company, was also usually a member of the negotiating
team.
Another important issue in the privatisation programme in Zambia has been
how to increase public participation in ownership of the enterprises. In order to
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address this issue, the Privatisation Act provided for the creation of the
Zambia Privatisation Trust Fund. The Trust Fund was established in 1994 and
its function is to warehouse shares reserved for flotation to the general public.
Other measures to assist potential Zambian buyers without any funds to
participate in the privatisation programme include: deferred payment
schemes, public flotations and ZPA Mortgage Scheme for houses and
deferral of payment for houses.
5.5. The Role of Zambia Privatisation Agency (ZPA)
ZPA has been established in 1992 through the Privatisation Act No.21 (1992).
Section 8 of Privatisation Act provides that it is the function of the Agency to
plan, implement and control the privatisation of SOEs in Zambia, in
cooperation with the government, by selling them off to those who are more
competent to run them and who have the required capital to do so.
But notwithstanding the generality of this statement it should be noted that by
law the functions of the Agency include the foregoing, that is to say:
I. recommending policy guidelines to the Cabinet; implementing the
privatisation programme according to the policy guidelines by the
Cabinet;
II. overseeing all aspects of the implementation of the privatisation
programme in Zambia;
III. monitoring progress of the privatisation programme;
IV. preparing the long-term divestiture sequence plan and submitting
such plan to the Cabinet for approval;
v. recommending to the Cabinet the most appropriate method of sale
for each SOE to be privatised;
vi. carrying out or causing to be carried out a valuation of a SOE that is
to be privatised; and
vii. setting pre-qualification criteria for the selection of potential buyers
or investors of a SOE to be privatised.
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In summary, the role of ZPA is to privatise identified SOEs in a transparent,
efficient and effective manner, in order to contribute to the stimulation of
economic growth; acceleration of development; facilitation of transformation of
the economy with broad participation; and generation of capital for the
government and long-term potential for employment.
5.6. The Role of Zambia Investment Centre (ZIC)
Zambia Investment Centre was established in 1992 to promote, implement,
coordinate and facilitate investment programmes and policies. The centre
provides information on the investment climate and identifies and promotes
opportunities for investment. The ZIC is also there to ensure that the
investment process is a smooth one for the investor, for example by assisting
the investor to secure any permit, licence, land etc. that he or she might need
(Zambia Investment Centre, 2000:7-8).
Other functions include the provision of consultancy services for the investor,
undertaking economic and sector studies with a view to identifying investment
opportunities, and facilitating joint venture arrangements between foreign and
domestic entrepreneurs. The ZIC also provides a wide range of fee and non-
fee based business services to the investor, including use of office equipment
such as fax machines, word processors and photocopiers, recruitment of
personnel on behalf of clients, undertaking of market surveys, and so on
(Zambia Investment Centre, 2000:8).
5.7. Then IFC in Zambia
As of June 30, 1996, Zambia retained 0.06% of IFC's capital stock. IFC has
approved 17 investment projects in Zambia since 1972, providing US$86
million in loans and US$2 million in equity financing for the Corporation's own
account. Seventy independent firms, half of which are from Zambia itself,
have provided an additional US$80 million loan, equity and quasi-equity
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funding. The total cost of these projects is more than US$585 million
(International Finance Corporation, 1997).
Table 6: International Finance Corporation Sectoral Distribution of
Investment Projects in Zambia
SECTOR No. of
PROJECTS
Manufacturing 4
Food and Agribusiness 4
Hotels and Tourism 3
Textiles 2
Mining and Extraction 2
Industrial and Consumer Services 1
Financial Services 1
TOTAL 17
Source: internetionel Fmance Corporation, 1997, p.1, February.
One IFC investment was approved in Zambia during FY96 through the
Corporation's Africa Enterprise Fund, which focuses on smaller investments
[US$100.000 to US$1.5 million] that contribute to broadening a country's
export base. Sunblest Milling Limited Company benefited from a US$700.000
loan for IFC's own account to purchase and install a wheat flour milling plant
(IFC, 1997). Another major investment worth noting is IFC investment worth
US$400,000 in NICO Insurance Zambia Limited (NICOZAM) in Lusaka to
establish a general insurance company providing short-term property and
casualty insurance signed in Lusaka, Zambia on the 2ih of August 1998
(Joseph, 1998).
5.8. Assessment
Evaluating the direct impacts of privatisation usually poses a problem in that
the measures related to the privatisation of public enterprises usually take
place at the same time as economy wide liberalisation measures (Adam,
1993). Evaluating the impact of privatisation in Zambia poses a similar
problem of trying to dissociate the effects of market liberalization and the
change of ownership itself. The assessment of the privatisation programme
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will focus on a number of key indicators including the impact on the
government resources, divestiture timing, and the extent of participation by
foreign investors.
Privatisation has certainly been the driving force behind the changes and
increased flow of investments into the country. The sell-off such as those of
Chilanga Cement, Zambia Breweries and Zambia Sugar Company can be
used to illustrate these developments. In the Chilanga Cement Privatisation,
Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC) increased their shareholdinq
and the company was the first to be listed on the Zambia Stock Exchange.
Chilanga has since received substantial new investments. The privatisation of
Zambia Breweries has also proved a successful operation. Both these
companies have also gone to the higher phase of offering shares to the
Public, the latest being Zambia Breweries through the Zambia Privatisation
Trust Fund (Fundanga and Mwaba, 1997).
In analysing the divestiture sequence, it is important to observe that Zambia
started with the small parastatal companies in tranche 1, and hoped to work
up into the larger ones in later trenches. The rationale for this approach was
that the privatisation agency would accumulate experience from the sale of
smaller companies which would be valuable in handling bigger and more
complex privatisation exercises. While this approach has its merits, it has the
disadvantage of starting the process of privatisation on a low note.
In a big privatisation programme such as the one in Zambia, one is interested
in knowing how much foreign investment is coming into the country, in what
sectors these investments are going and the origins of the foreign investors.
The overall picture that emerges is that foreign investors are moving into all
aspects of the Zambian business. The Zambian privatisation programme has
attracted a cross section of investors from the USA, UK, India, South Africa,
Germany, including companies such as Tate & Lyle, Unilever, Anglo
American Corporation, Lonhro, Phelps Dodge, Clark Cotton, among others,
however this has only been modest given the impetus of Zambia's
privatisation programme (Zambia Privatisation Agency, 2000e).
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The major foreign investors so far have come from the United Kingdom mainly
CDC (mostly through conversion of debt to equity and exercise of pre-emptive
rights) and LONRHO, and South Africa mainly through Anglo American
Corporation. It is significant to note that these three companies have had a
presence in Zambia for a long time.
However, the success of the programme tangible enough to be felt by the
average Zambian will depend largely on the stimulation of both domestic and
foreign investment which are now modest. The need to encourage share
ownership and giving economic power to the people will also play an
important role in this regard.
Experience has shown that the most successful privatisation programmes
have been those involving private sales via competitive bidding and
acquisition by use of preemptive rights. Companies that have been privatised
in this manner have attracted considerable interest from local as well as
international investors and have gained substantially from the infusion of new
resources in terms of capital and management. As acknowledged by
Chilipamushi (1994), private sales through competitive and negotiated bids
have been used successfully, especially in cases where the bidding firm buys
whole or part of the state enterprise being sold.
It is apparent that the other options for the modalities of sale available have
not been pursued much more rigorously. The ZPA could have considered
adopting any of the following: leasing of state owned enterprises; dilution of
shares i.e. where the government increased the subscribed share capital of
an SOE to be privatised with eventual aim; and subcontracting, this takes
several variations - supply of goods and services, management contracts and
even leasing.
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION
6.1. Was the Purpose of this Study Fulfilled?
The purpose of this study was described in Chapter 1 as follows:
I. to investigate the role privatisation of state owned enterprises play
in attracting FDI, with special reference to South Africa and Zambia;
II. to assess how successful privatisation of state owned enterprises
has been in attracting FDI;
III. to compare the political economy of privatisation in South Africa and
Zambia; and
IV. to furnish recommendations on the way forward.
This study revealed that both South Africa and Zambia succeeded in
attracting FDI through their processes of privatisation. In both countries major
FDI inflows have been an outcome of privatisation. Although proportionally
South Africa has been a major benefactor of FDI following Angola in Africa, its
potential to benefit more is higher than that of its competitors. The
performance of Zambia in this segment has also been an impressive one.
Chapter 5 has shown that the Zambian privatisation programme managed to
attract a cross section of investors from the USA, UK, India, South Africa,
Germany, including companies such as Tate & Lyle, Unilever, Anglo
American Corporation, Lonhro, Phelps Dodge, Clark Cotton among others.
The political economies of South Africa and Zambia have been favourable to
foreign investors. Chapter 2 revealed that getting the policy environment right
is what determines FDI inflow. Privatisation, among others, is one of them.
South Africa and Zambia managed to liberalise their economies. And with no
doubt, the two political economies are the most market-friendly in Africa.
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6.2. Significance of the Results
In this concluding Chapter, it is important to restate the importance of the
study. As mentioned in Chapter 1 the value of this study lies in the following
aspects:
I. it showed that a major factor behind the FDI growth is the continued
trend towards privatisation;
II. South Africa will have to speed up its privatisation programme if it
wants to attract more FDI;
III. the consolidation of the South African economy might facilitate its
developmental role in the Southern African region; and
IV. there are lessons to be learned by South Africa from Zambia's
privatisation approach and experience.
Throughout this study reference was made that FDI is one of the major forces
that drive economic growth. The study has been carried out bearing in mind
that privatisation in developing economies plays an important role in attracting
FDI with a special reference to South Africa and Zambia. The reasoning
behind this being that there are extras that flow in along with foreign capital,
as FDI brings in equity financing, which helps increase production and growth,
which in turn:
I. creates employment;
II. lead to a transfer of technology and managerial skills;
iii. provides valuable sources of foreign currency;
IV. raises income levels; and
v. generally results in economic growth.
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Thus, in examining and analysing the role of privatisation to FOI, the study
followed the reasoning that when countries embark upon privatisation, they
liberalise their economies thereby implementing market-friendly policies to
foreign investors. This is so because for a number of cost-cutting, market
opportunity and networking reasons, transnational corporations have actively
sought to participate in the privatisation process (Odie, 1993:7). To this, host
countries, for their part, have sought to involve foreign investors in order to tap
their vast capital resources and to gain access to their considerable
technological, management and marketing skills.
In Chapter 2, it was revealed that privatisation would help South Africa and
Zambia to better deal with their debt restructuring and empowerment
problems. Both South African and Zambian economies have been
characterised by high state involvement. And because of public sector
inefficiency inherent from lack of competition, fiscal spending, and corruption;
SOEs have deepened the borrowing burden and debt servicing as a result.
This study revealed that privatisation proceeds could play an important role in
servicing or even repaying the debt. This would be most helpful because this
way highly indebted SOEs indirectly repay their debts which reduces the
burden on the tax payers while the restructuring may even rescue these
SOEs from sinking.
In terms of empowerment, both South Africa and Zambia have been
impressive. In its empowerment plans South Africa has proposed three kinds
of intervention in SOEs restructuring processes:
I. SOE ownership can be broadened through the National
Empowerment Fund and other kinds of unit trust structures, in ways
that address the problems in existing empowerment-related
financial engineering. These new approaches can take the best
lessons (and avoid the most serious drawbacks) of international
experiences of collective investment vehicles, to provide a range of
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equity schemes for those previously excluded from mainstream
economic participation.
II. Operational empowerment strategies should be improved to ensure
that beneficiaries are not merely absentee owners. They should be
able to gain meaningful access to state-regulated activities, through
training and skills development, affirmative action in management,
and entrepreneurial opportunities through outsourcing,
partnerships, affirmative procurement and easier access to finance.
III. Combining the first two strategies, alternative vehicles for
empowerment, such as employee share ownership plans and
community trusts should be piloted. It is believed that this will
improve enterprise self-management and community involvement,
and in the process raise investment in and take advantage of social
capital.
Zambia in its restructuring process has established a temporary Privatisation
Trust Fund (PTF) wherein shares of newly privatised enterprises for the
subsequent sale to investors by a way of public offering with the aim of
achieving a wide distribution among citizens of Zambia. Other ways of
assisting potential Zambian buyers without any funds to participate in the
privatisation programme are: deferred payment schemes, public flotations,
and ZPA mortgage scheme for houses and deferral of payment for houses.
Privatisation programmes both in South Africa and Zambia are being used to
achieve many goals. These structural adjustments are aimed at addressing
major economic, political and social problems in the two economies. To this
end, it is apparent that privatisation is not only good for creating competitive
markets; bringing in foreign capital; and technology transfers and managerial
skills, but also to address political and social issues alike.
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6.3. Were the Concepts Useful?
The following concepts were conceptualised: public corporations,
privatisation, commercialisation, FOI, and divestiture. Reasons why these
concepts were selected for conceptualisation are:
i. they are core reference to this study;
II. they are often confused with other related concepts to them; and
iii. they are often taken for granted by readers.
In understanding the debate around privatisation of SOEs to become private
enterprises, for example, the starting point is to understand the basic, but
often taken for granted, operational definition of a public corporation and its
characteristics. The characteristics of a public corporation as mentioned in
Chapter 1 are as follows:
I. They are wholly state-owned.
II. They are not subject to parliamentary financial scrutiny such as that
to which government departments are subjected.
iii. They are statutorily created and outside the ambit of ordinary
company law.
IV. They have corporate status and thus can be sued, hold property
and enter into contracts.
v. In theory, at least, they are independently financed through their
revenue and also capital borrowing powers.
VI. Employees of public corporations are not civil servants but are
employed directly by, and subject to, conditions of the corporations.
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Other concepts as defined in Chapter 1 have been conceptualised in the
same way in order to remove misconceptions about them and create a better
understanding of what the study argues, prescribes and fails to clarify. This
study is aimed at stimulating further research on the topic and leaves a room
for improvement and therefore the audience must be able to judge with ease
where the loopholes are.
6.4. South Africa and Zambia Compared
As indicated in Chapters 4 and 5, both South Africa and Zambia have offered
comprehensive packages to attract and steer FDI. The success of the
privatisation programmes depends on the nature of institution tasked with the
process. In South Africa, the Ministry of Public Enterprises leads the process
of privatisation, whereas in Zambia the legal authority driving the process is
the ZPA. The ZPA has managed to privatise 244 of its 312 SOEs earmarked
for privatisation.
In Chapter 4 reference was made that the privatisation programme in South
Africa is a very new phenomenon, which started in 1994. Since the publication
of the restructuring discussion document of 1995, there have been a number
of further elaborations of its objectives: the 1996 Growth Employment and
Redistribution (GEAR) strategy, the 1996 National Framework Agreement
(NFA) and the 1999 Interministerial Cabinet Committee on the Restructuring
of State Assets (IMCC).
Some objectives may have been prioritised differently in the various
documents, but little difference exists in the overall statement of objectives.
However, it was GEAR strategy which provided direction for privatisation. The
government motivated that privatisation would ease problems in the public
sector of: finance, inefficiency, and black empowerment.
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The reason why GEAR provided a direction for privatisation in the presence of
the Ministry of Public Enterprises was that the Ministry was delaying the
process of privatisation. The reason why in the same year of GEAR, the NFA
had to be introduced in order to speed up the privatisation process. This was
due to the complexities of the privatisation process of certain entities,
particularly those with clear public policy.
This slowed the privatisation process. Another way had to be found to speed
up the privatisation process. In 1999, the IMCC directed that a policy
framework be prepared to guide the restructuring process into the 21st
century. On 10 August 2000, the restructuring policy framework was launched
in order to provide a more comprehensive framework than has existed to
date, and to ensure a consistent approach to restructuring across government
and to address perceived market uncertainties about government's
restructuring priorities.
The policy framework has managed to gather a general agreement about how
the restructuring process should be improved in order to ensure that the
accelerated agenda could be achieved. The department has been consulting
participants involved in previous and current restructuring initiatives to gather
suggestions, which include the following: arrangements to improve
stakeholder involvement could take advantage of the LRA and Social Plan
and the NFA to address high-level political engagement; the Department of
Public Enterprises would lead the restructuring of SOEs and co-ordinate the
activities of policy departments and finance through a number of sector-
specific programme officers; and the roles and responsibilities of government
and the boards and management of SOEs in the restructuring process should
be identified and then clarified by the proposed shareholder compact and a
revised protocol on corporate governance.
As discussed in Chapter 5, compared to South Africa's privatisation
programme, major lessons are drawn from Zambia's privatisation programme.
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The government's commitment is both a measure of and the most important
factor in the success of Zambia's programme. This is reflected in the
resources invested in careful programme design and preparation. Following
the announcement of the policy on privatisation in May 1990, the government
in September 1990, set up a Task Force on privatisation. The Task Force
which submitted its report to the Minister of Finance in January 1991,
recommended the creation of two organs: Steering Committee on
Privatisation; and Technical Committee on Privatisation.
The Steering Committee was to be responsible for policy issues on
Privatisation while the Technical Committee was to be responsible for the
actual privatisation activities. The Technical Committee was drawn from within
the parastatal sector. And to facilitate the process, the government moved
quickly to pass the necessary legislation. In July, 1992, the Privatisation Act
(No:21 of 1992) was passed by Parliament. This Act established the ZPA as
the sole institution responsible for the divestiture of state enterprises.
A noteworthy feature of the programme's success is the involvement and
oversight of the divestiture process through the ZPA. Constantly reinventing
its approach to fit its needs, the ZPA has used a variety of methods for sell-
offs. It is ranged from public tender and public flotation to management buy-
outs.
In order to broaden ownership the Privatisation Trust Fund was established in
June 1994 temporarily to warehouse shares, which are later to be sold
through public flotation. Other measures to assist potential Zambian buyers
without any funds to participate in the privatisation programme include:
deferred payment schemes, public flotations and ZPA Mortgage Scheme for
houses and deferral of payment for houses.
As far as FDI trends are concern, the main impetus for FDI in Zambia has
come from privatisation programme. In South Africa privatisation has become
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increasingly important for attracting FDI, although it is far from being explored.
Both South Africa and Zambia are competing for few FDI flows in the world.
The Zambian privatisation programme has attracted a cross section of
investors from the USA, UK, India, South Africa, Germany, including
companies such as Tate & Lyle, Unilever, Anglo American Corporation,
Lonhro, Phelps Dodge, Clark Cotton, among others.
Most of the FDI in South Africa came from five countries: the UK, Malaysia,
the USA, Germany and Japan. In 1998 FDI flows continued to be driven by
privatisation. This year witnessed FDI through privatisation from Malaysia
(Telkom), the USA (Telkom) and Italy (Airpots Company).
Apart from South Africa receiving FDI from other countries, it has also played
a role in investing directly in African countries, particularly SADC member
states. One country that benefited heavily from South Africa's investment is
Zambia (Shoprite Checkers and Anglo American which a major investor in
ZCCM). South Africa has the resources that the African region desires
desperately. And it has the potential to better the economies of African states.
Thus, South Africa must be seen as a 'flying geese' (growth pole) of Africa.
6.5. Recommendations
Zambia's privatisation programme is leading in Africa. South Africa finds itself
in a contradictory position. On the one hand it is the leading economic power
in Africa, while on the other hand it still lags behind in terms of restructuring its
parastatals.
In September 2000, Zambia already managed to privatise 244 of its 312
SOEs and more impressively, at the time, the ZPA is currently working on the
privatisation of the following nine companies and other four major SOEs,
these are: Indeni Petroleum Refinery, Zambia Postal Services Corporation,
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Zambia Electricity Supply Corporation and Zambia National Commercial
Bank.
In South Africa, the current stage of development necessitates a mixed
economy model, with both the state and the market playing key roles; this
sets the context for the restructuring of SOEs. Therefore, the restructuring
programme should take into consideration a range of models, choosing a
model that, on the balance of evidence, would best meet the overall
objectives and strategy for restructuring. While it draws on Zambia practice
and experience, the approach should be primarily in response to the internal
and external factors that affect the South African economy.
The restructuring plans for individual enterprises should be developed in line
with the Zambian experience, while at the same time considering the
individual attributes of each enterprise. The government should use this
model to achieve its privatisation objectives. While each individual
restructuring may not achieve all the stated objectives, the overall
restructuring programme should enable the government to achieve its aims.
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